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Summary 
 
Theories of organisational innovation incorporate many ideas derived from, or related to, 
complexity theory. This is what sets organisational theories focused on innovation apart from 
mainstream management theories focused on control and coordination. However, complexity 
theory is treated as an inspiration, rather than a significant consideration in these theories.  
The thesis is an inquiry into the relevance of one of the concepts from complexity theory, 
namely emergence, to our understanding of innovation in an organisational context. The 
question explored is how the notion of emergence explain aspects of innovation. 
Unfortunately, even in complexity theories relying on it, the concept of emergence is often 
not properly explained beyond a simple definition that the emergent1 “whole is more than the 
sum of its parts” and can therefore not be explained by reductionist means that only focus on 
the constituent parts. 
The introduction develops the problem by relating themes common to the phenomena of 
management, innovation, and organised complexity. Using selected theories, the chapter 
shows how ideas from complexity theory became adopted by organisation and management 
thinkers. 
Chapter 2 offers an overview of extant theories of innovation and distinguishes diverse types 
of innovation found in the organisational context.  The following theories are reviewed: Dey's 
enablers of innovation, Holland's complex innovation process, Chesborough's open 
innovation concept, Weick's social creation, and a model of diffusion of innovation. It is 
demonstrated how these theories were inspired by and rely on ideas from complexity 
science.  
Chapter 3 turns to emergence, the concept at the heart of complexity theory. The chapter 
offers an overview of Emmeche, Køppe, and Stjernfelt's ontology of levels and their attempt 
to give substance to the concept of emergence. To relate these ideas to organisations, it is 
shown how emergence operates in Polanyi's Gestalt inspired theory of knowledge. 
                                                
1 Phenomena that exhibits the evidence of the process of emergence.   
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Chapter 4 considers how selected themes from emergence relate to the innovation theories 
described in the thesis.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 three possible answers are offered about how emergence can help to 
understand organisational innovation. Emergence is a viewpoint of the full innovation 
process or it can indeed be a useful prescription for how to organise in order to innovate. It 
may offer a metaphor or analogy for part of the innovation process. It is concluded that 
emergence is a useful metaphor for the creative phase of the innovative process.  
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Opsomming 
 
Teorieë van organisatoriese innovasie bevat baie idees afkomstig van, of verwant aan, 
kompleksiteitsteorie. Dit is wat organisasie teorieë fokus op innovasie anders maak as die 
hoofstroombestuursteorieë wat op beheer en koördinasie fokus. Die kompleksiteitsteorie 
word egter as 'n inspirasie, eerder as 'n sentrale oorweging, in hierdie teorieë beskou. 
Die tesis is 'n ondersoek na die relevansie van een van die konsepte van kompleksiteitsteorie, 
naamlik ontvouing ("emergence"), tot ons begrip van innovasie in 'n organisatoriese konteks. 
Die vraag wat ondersoek word, is die mate waarin ontvouing kan help om aspekte van 
innovasie te verduidelik. Ongelukkig, selfs in kompleksiteitsteorieë wat daarop staatmaak, 
word die konsep van ontvouing dikwels nie behoorlik verduidelik nie, behalwe vir 'n 
eenvoudige definisie dat die ontvouende "geheel meer as die som van sy dele is" en dus nie 
verklaar kan word deur reduksionistiese metodes wat slegs op die samestellende dele fokus 
nie. 
Die inleiding ontwikkel die probleem deur die temas wat algemeen verband hou met die 
verskynsels van bestuur, innovasie en georganiseerde kompleksiteit met mekaar in verband te 
bring. Die hoofstuk toon die mate waartoe idees van kompleksiteitsteorie deur organisasie– 
en bestuursdenke oorgeneem is. 
Hoofstuk 2 bied 'n oorsig van bestaande teorieë van innovasie en onderskei verskillende 
soorte innovasie wat in die organisatoriese konteks voorkom. Die volgende teorieë word 
beskryf: Dey se instaatstellers van innovasie, Holland se komplekse innovasieproses, 
Chesborough se oop-innovasiekonsep, Weick se sosiale skepping, en 'n model van die 
verspreiding van innovasie. Daar word getoon hoe hierdie teorieë geïnspireer is deur en 
vertrou op idees uit kompleksiteitswetenskap. 
Hoofstuk 3 draai na ontvouing, die kernkonsep van kompleksiteitsteorie. Die hoofstuk bied 'n 
oorsig van Emmeche, Køppe, en Stjernfelt se ontologie van vlakke en hul poging om die 
konsep van ontvouing uit te bou. Om hierdie idees aan organisasies te koppel, word 
aangetoon hoe ontvouing in Polanyi se Gestalt-geïnspireerde kennisteorie funksioneer. 
Hoofstuk 4 oorweeg hoe geselekteerde temas uit ontvouing betrekking het op die 
innovasieteorieë wat in die tesis beskryf word. 
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Ten slotte word in Hoofstuk 5 drie moontlike antwoorde aangevoer oor die mate waarin 
ontvouing kan help om innovasie in organisasies te verstaan. Ontvouing is 'n siening van die 
volle innoveringsproses, of dit kan inderdaad 'n nuttige voorskrif wees vir hoe om te 
organiseer ten einde te innoveer. Alternatiewelik kan dit 'n metafoor of analogie bied vir 'n 
deel van die innovasieproses. Daar word tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat ontvouing 'n 
nuttige metafoor is vir die kreatiewe fase van die innoverende proses. 
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Chapter 1 
Complexity, Emergence and 
Innovation 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The sustainability of organisations, amongst other aspects, depends on how well they 
innovate.  That need to innovate exists in a complex environment. That complexity has been 
the subject of many studies within this century and the previous one. 
Complexity has been used in the explanation of networks, both animate and inanimate. It is 
one of the most satisfying theories in the analysis of organisation and organisations. 
Numerous studies under its theme, adding new and valuable knowledge that is quite 
significant to modern civilisation. 
Within complexity, a key notion, emergence, is one of its markers.  
This study explores the implications of the knowledge of complexity, and especially 
emergence, in selected theories, on the processes innovation.  
There is a need to investigate the relationship between complexity, emergence and innovation 
to open new areas of focus for organisations and individuals involved in innovation. This is 
because most of the attention, with respect to innovation, has been on its “mechanical” 
dimension. A significant amount of information and knowledge has been created on its linear 
and mechanical aspects as opposed to its non-linear dimension.  
Some authors have written on the special relationship between emergence and innovation. 
Goldstein3 highlighted that the kind of focus was still in its “infancy’ and would progress 
through “cross- and multi-disciplinarity”. 
Alstyne and Logan4 quip that “design”, that is the mechanical activity within innovation, 
whilst important, is not adequate to guarantee success of the process. They suggest a need to 
consider emergence in the innovation scheme. 
The objective of this research is to expose the role of complexity and, especially, emergence 
theories in organisational innovation processes using select literature analysis.  
                                                
3 Goldstein, 2005. 
4 Van Alstyne and Logan, 2007 
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There appears to be some complexity in the innovation process as brought out by a study of 
certain complexity theories discussed in this chapter5. Although Weick, Boisot and Snowden 
are discussing separate complexity theory subjects, they are addressing dimensions of 
innovation.  
The critical activity in this study will be an exploration of complexity and emergence in 
existing literature and test whether these notions are useful concepts for understanding 
innovation. An important question will be to consider whether emergence can be a basis for 
modelling of innovation. Emergence, appears to be a suitable theory for innovation but is not 
a notion that is as commonplace or of renown as is innovation. Therefore, the thesis seeks to 
revisit the technical meaning of emergence in systems literature and then to relate it to the 
ways in which the concept is characterises organisational innovation. 
It will be worthwhile to make a beneficial proposal on how emergence relates to innovation. 
Organisations should be concerned about the role complexity and emergence influence their 
innovation processes. Business operating environments are exposed to the influence of a 
multitude of factors. These act as networks that shape and influence internal processes.  
Organisation is increasingly about recognising how both external and internal networks shape 
products and services. It is surprising that some enterprises still operate in ignorance of this 
reality. Innovation processes are seen in most establishments as isolated from complexity. 
Some studies, which motivated the focus of this thesis, have a different perception and seek 
to establish a connection between emergence, creativity and innovation.6 
These realities are justification for a study such as this one. 
This chapter will introduce the key notions in this study, namely complexity, emergence and 
innovation.  
Three theories will aid in the introduction of complexity and their discussions are in Sections 
1.2 to 1.5 below. It is necessary to explain complexity, the “overriding” notion. It will be 
briefly clarified why complexity is such a critical subject in modern day analysis of 
organisation.  
Although a chapter is dedicated to the analysis of a text on emergence, that notion will be 
introduced in Section 1.6. That section will locate emergence as an important theme in 
complexity. Secondly it aims to develop a case on why emergence is a viable notion for the 
explanation of innovation.  
                                                
5 See Sections 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 
6 For example, Goldstein, 2005 
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Innovation, dealt with using several theories in Chapter 2 in greater detail, will be introduced 
in Section 1.7. The starting point is therefore the “target”, innovation, before a discussion on 
emergence. This requires some clarification. Innovation is the notion we seek to enrich, and 
emergence is the notion that will be explored and considered as a form of explaining 
innovation.  
It should be clarified that this study will not claim that innovation is a part of emergence nor 
that innovation is like emergence. The first is a description of one being a subset and the 
second, a description of likeness.  Both assertions, justified or not, are not our concern. The 
idea is to consider emergence within the processes of innovation.  
This should primarily demand a description of both innovation and emergence. Chapters 2 
and 3 are therefore necessary and essential activities in this exercise as they describe, using 
selected theories, innovation and emergence.  
In Chapter 3 the position will be to present emergence as having a wide implication that also 
extends to innovation. 
 
1.2 Complexity  
 
The Newtonian approach to phenomena has dominated intellectual analysis. The tendency 
has been to regard all phenomena as in the mechanical dimension and work out results and 
consequences based on physical laws7 only. Physical, social and organisational systems have 
been analysed in this way for a long time. This is also called reductionism. 
Reductionism is a philosophical position assumes that the whole of a complex entity can be 
reduced to its constituent parts and that analysis is the appropriate method for understanding 
phenomena. It is a belief that wholes can be broken down for analysis.  
The specific area of interest for inquiry has been the organisation8. In these settings, multiple 
systems are observable and create fertile complexity conditions. Morgan9 identifies several 
metaphors in his description of “organisation”. His “organisation” appears, interestingly, as in 
the verb-form. Remarkably, and worth drawing attention in this study, is his depiction of the 
machine metaphor alongside other metaphors. The machine metaphor typifies, for our 
purpose, the regard of phenomena in a mechanical sense. Morgan views organisations as 
                                                
7 For example, the law of gravity, the law of motion and so on. 
8 We must resolve it early that this is not only about the profit-making enterprise. It is also the social, 
educational or not-for-profit enterprise. 
9 Morgan, 1997 
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systems in his concept of metaphors. It mechanical view ‘reduces’ organisational participants 
and activities into simple forms comparable to machine parts. Examples of this concept are 
the structure of governments, the configuration of production processes, studies of nutrition, 
the set-up of security systems, military establishments and many others.  
A growing number of modern scholars are starting to discover the difficulty of maintaining 
this form of reductionist analysis for all phenomena. It is certainly difficult to apply to the 
social entities that dominate most areas of how our lives are organised. Other depictions of 
organisation illustrate, and perhaps fit, the complex nature of organisations. This is not to say 
the mechanical view should be discarded as a standpoint. It demonstrates reductionist notions 
suitable in certain, but limited in other, areas of study or functions. Systems (fitting 
reductionist perception) are mostly “hard”10 in nature and enjoy the old structured view. The 
view with brighter prospects is that of perceiving organisations as complex systems. Studies 
about complex systems are grouped under a body of knowledge generally known as 
“Complexity Theory”11, which is the theory that informs this thesis. 
The most important observation from the foregoing would be to point out simultaneous, near 
chaotic, existence of systems in even the smallest of sectors in most organisational settings. 
The conditions surrounding activities for the achievement of organisational missions, goals, 
strategies and objectives are a melting-pot of systems that complexly shape outcomes. They 
are composite. An illustration12of a complex adaptive system13 is shown in Figure 1. 
                                                
10 Used in this thesis to mean what is related to technology of physics or engineering and opposed to “soft”. 
11 Jackson MC, 2003 p. 11 
12 Hakimi, 2010 
13 Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). The alternative name for complex systems bearing also the “adaptive” 
adjective in the name. They are “adaptive” because they are dynamic.  
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Figure 1. Depiction of Complexity / Complex Adaptive System14 
The illustration in Figure 1 shows how complexity systems or complex adaptive systems 
function. There is a feedback loop (seen in the arrows “Info In” and “Info Out”). The 
behaviour of the system is related to the environment (which is itself changing and 
continuously affecting the system). The parts of the system are “Simple Self-Organised Local 
Relationships” which have “emergence” as a distinguishing characteristic. 
Most depictions of complex systems have much in common with Morgan’s15 “organism” 
metaphor. The themes below are common in complex systems and the “organism” metaphor: 
                                                
14 Hakimi, 2010 
15 Morgan, 1997 
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1. Adaptation – change is guaranteed and related to the environment  
2. Open nature – external factors have a bearing on what happens in the system 
3. Variety – there are multiple entities and systems in interaction 
4. Ecology – the entities depend and determine each other’s behaviour 
5. Significance of the environment – what happens outside the system has a 
remarkable influence on internal factors 
Our interest is about complexity in this study is around its creative nature. In this 
introduction, the focus is to explain this creative nature of complexity by dealing with a 
sample of theories that will prime our discussion on two subjects, namely innovation and 
emergence. Weick, Boisot and Snowden, in their organisational theories on sensemaking, the 
“Information Space” (or the I-Space) and the Cynefin Model all bring out the notion of 
complexity and point out aspects related to its creativity. 
 
1.3 Weick’s Enactive of Sensible Environments  
 
The concept of “environment” listed above is discussed here in relation to Weick’s16 
“enactive of sensible environments” that he points out to be a property of sensemaking and 
explains himself thus 
...sensemaking better explains how entities get there in the first place... I use 
the term enactment to preserve the fact that, in organizational life, people 
often produce part of the environment they face.17 
He goes on to state how people act to create new features of the environment that did not 
exist before. Weick quoting Follet also claims that "...there is no result of process but only a 
moment in process."18 Also, quoting Heider, Weick says “it takes a complex sensing system 
to register and regulate a complex object.”19 Further he also says that "[i]f people have 
multiple identities and deal with multiple realities, why should we expect them to be 
ontological purists?20 This discounting of ontological purity in social and organisational 
systems is an embrace of complexity inherent in such systems. 
                                                
16 Weick, 1995 
17 Weick, 1995 p. 30 
18 Weick, 1995 p. 33 
19 Weick, 1995 p. 34 - 35 
20 Weick, 1995 p. 35 
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Weick warns of Cartesian21 anxiety:  
...the idea that there is a world with pre-given ideas or ready-made (sic) 
information... (accept) that ‘groundlessness is the very condition for the richly 
textured and interdependent world of human experience... [the world is not 
fixed and pre-given but] continually shaped by the types of actions we engage’ 
Varela et al.22 
In a way, this concept of Weick’s is an emphasis of the themes of relatedness and 
combination. The critical aspect of it is the consequence inherent in “enaction” (and indeed) 
sensemaking is creation, because "[p]eople create their environments and those environments 
creates them."23 
Whilst Weick’s theory is concerned with this relatedness of aspects in the organisation and 
how they in turn determine actions and meaning, Boisot handles the “movement” of 
information in the organisation and how it translates to and as value. 
  
                                                
21 Relating to the theory and philosophy of René Descartes. 
22 Weick, 1995 p. 37 - 38 
23 Weick, 1995 p. 34 
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1.4 Boisot’s I-Space 
 
The Boisot’s description of his I-Space24 has elements within it that clearly draw it closer to 
complexity theory notions. Boisot’s I-Space may be explored to explain innovation, 
complexity and slight emergence elements. There is an introduction of both innovation and 
emergence later in this chapter. 
Boisot’s theory of the I-Space25 is an explanation of the dynamics of information and 
knowledge flows within an organisation. It is a theory that analyses the nature and processes 
around knowledge assets within what Boisot calls the Social Learning Cycle26. Knowledge 
assets are "...stocks of knowledge from which services are expected to flow for a period of 
time that may be hard to specify in advance."27  
In describing knowledge assets this way, Boisot also points out that the specific way these 
assets will behave in future is not known beforehand. This signifies a non-linearity in the 
behaviour of knowledge assets. They are also described as "complex configurations of 
interrelated elements."28 This description of knowledge assets conjures up a description of 
this organisational aspect in systems terms. Further, 
Since a firm’s knowledge assets are more broadly defined than its 
technologies, their identification poses delicate problems, exacerbated by the 
particular way they evolve over time.29  
Identification of knowledge assets is complex and the same cannot be said about mechanistic 
processes that tend to obey a reductionists characterisation. Knowledge assets also evolve 
with the passage of time. In Boisot’s words they have a “dynamic evolution”30  
Knowledge assets are “stock” because they yield returns in much the same way as physical 
assets. They have value and are emergent. In Boisot’s words: "Extracting value from 
knowledge assets requires an ability to manage them as they emerge."31 There is a unique 
                                                
24 Boisot, 1998 
25 Boisot, 1998 
26 In summary, this cycle traces value addition to information or knowledge as diffused, undiffused, abstract or 
concrete. 
27 Boisot, 1998 p. 3. 
28 Boisot, 1998 p. 64. 
29 Boisot, 1998 p. 42. 
30 Boisot, 1998 p. 58. 
31 Boisot, 1998 p 70. 
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management form that is suggested by Boisot on knowledge assets. It is not proactive but one 
that is concurrent with the dynamics and status of the phenomena as “(it) emerges.”  The 
value of knowledge assets has a complex quality, because "[v]alue in the I-Space 
is...inherently unstable."32 
Instability has an association with risk. Risk, in economic terms, may easily translate to high 
returns or deep losses depending on how they are managed. The recommendation by Boisot 
to manage knowledge assets as they emerge enables the realisation of connections and the 
management of instability. Unstable economic phenomena normally warrant close 
monitoring. 
Boisot’s argument is that knowledge assets are “within”33 the organisation’s employees or 
members amongst other entities. How they are perceived, used and handled is dependent on 
the placement of the individual. Commenting on this phenomenon, Boisot, points this out 
about management’s action in this process, 
Using simple scales they are usually able to rate without... the degree of 
codification, abstraction, and diffusion of their firm’s products, technologies, 
and organizational elements. They first do this individually, reaching 
consensus iteratively through discussion.34 
Different diffusion scales, for example, can be used to represent, respectively, employees 
within department. Consensus itself is a product or creation. It is the result of a process.  
Snowden, below, explores the complexity in managing knowledge in his model showing four 
quadrants with different kinds of order and a fifth zone of disorder in the centre. 
  
                                                
32 Boisot, 1998 p. 81. 
33 This is an expedient preposition. It does not fully address the scope of the concept. 
34 Boisot, 1998 p. 64. 
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Figure 2. Cynefin Model35  
  
                                                
35 Lal Patary, 2015 
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1.5 Snowden’s Cynefin Model – Complexity in Managing Knowledge 
 
Crutchfield noted that: 
If a system is chaotic, how chaotic is it? A measure of chaos is the ‘‘entropy’’ 
of the motion, which roughly speaking is the average rate of stretching and 
folding, or the average rate at which information is produced36 
The edge of chaos37 is a zone of high disturbance and collision along the border between 
order and chaos. This disturbance, though bearing qualities that may seem erratic, is 
beneficial, because it holds the promise of new patterns of organised complexity. In the 
Cynefin Model38, Snowden presents a model for knowledge systems with four zones: Chaos, 
Complex, Knowable and Known. What he calls Cynefin dynamics is the various movements 
and transformations between these four zones of various kinds of order. Brainstorming, 
analysis and most activities that seek to unpack and break down or define a challenge are in 
the dimension of the Knowable. Once there is reasonable information about a challenge, 
interventions, strategies, procedures and implementation of changes that are effected to fit 
into the dimension of the Known. The clutter of phenomena or information at the chaos stage 
is chaotic but not random. It may appear to be random to observers, but Snowden does not 
see chaos as equivalent to disorder; instead the zone of disorder has a category of its own in 
the centre of the Cynefin model. Chaos emanates from the abundance of data, information 
and other factors. Chaos is associated with lack of clarity from the point of view of an 
observer. It is a result of previous processes, but it is also a start. Because it is start, it holds 
the promise of new patterns emerging that could be stabilized and moved into the Complex 
zone for instance.  
Snowden, commenting about knowledge systems, says this about the scenario that 
...we never start from a zero base when we design a knowledge system, all 
players in that system come with the baggage, positive and negative derived 
from multiple histories.39 
                                                
36 James P. Crutchfield, J. Doyne Farmer, Norman H. Packard, and Robert S. Shaw, Chaos, edited by Mark A. 
Bedau and Paul Humphreys 2008 Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science, The MIT 
Press, London 
37 In this text, it is understood to mean the characteristic of complex systems implying the existing of seemingly 
unrelated phenomena working towards a state that is not surprisingly non-linear or unpredictable in. 
38 Snowden, 2002 
39 Snowden, 2002 
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At the start40 there is discord in the arrangement of the units in the system. There is no 
certainty about what has benefit or does not have. The units draw from other processes they 
have been a part of or are still a part of. It is perhaps impossible for only one entity to exist 
alone and as the only factor in any zone or scene. The other significant point is the diversity 
in the initial set-up or chaotic zone. Snowden remarks about patterns and logic in the system 
with respect to time.  
A feature of a complex system is the phenomenon of retrospective coherence in 
which the current state of affairs always makes logical sense, but only when 
we look backwards. The current pattern is logical, but is only one of many 
patterns that could have formed, any one of which would be equally logical. 
The status quo is sensibly explained by a sequence of events leading up to it. At the time, 
each took place, there was no means of working out that they would have culminated to the 
present format of phenomena. A range of possibilities had an opportunity to form and only 
after patterns formed can they be "managed" by either trying to stabilise or disrupt them. Of 
course, disruption does not guarantee that a desirable new pattern will form. There is little 
room to use the present situation to predict probable future scenarios. The best way to 
"manage" the situation, if there is need, is to focus on relationships between elements and to 
heed the formation of patterns as they occur. 
The nature of the Complex domain is the management of patterns. We need to 
identify the early signs of a pattern forming and disrupt those we find 
undesirable while stabilising those we want. If we are really clever then we 
seed the space to encourage the formation of patterns that we can control.41 
To point out the requirement for cleverness and the need for prompt diagnosis of 
relationships and patterns appeals to the rapid rate of change within the system. Viewed 
closer, the proposal, in managing within the complex zone or complexity, is to not focus on 
traditional factors like individual parts. It is assumed ideal to focus on the system and see the 
patterns formed by the interactions between the individual parts scheme.  
The complex zone is an information-rich zone. This brings our discussion to Weick’s42 
regard of information. His scenario is one that is characterised by many possible messages 
                                                
40 There is a misleading notion about this. “Start” assumes a beginning and an end in the process. A point 
stressed in this thesis, and indeed a theme in complex systems is the non-existence of commencement or 
terminal points. It is only for academic purposes that a starting point must be located.  
41 Snowden, 2002 
42 Weick, 1995 
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that can be plausibly constructed from a flow of stimuli that are selected and framed by 
observers as cues. Weick recognises the response to a complex situation as “shock”43 
requiring the imposition of a frame on the overload of information to filter what is sensible. A 
contrasting situation is one where there are not enough cues available in information-scarce 
environments, which he calls conditions of “uncertainty” needing a widening of the frame or 
better search to include more cues. However, in complex environments the problem is too 
much information, Weick says they demand a certain form of information management. 
Rather than focus on the amount of information, management in complexity and ambiguity 
rather requires an improvement in the form and quality of the information. Information 
richness, therefore, does not necessarily mean the existence of sense, instead it increases the 
burden on the framing activity of the sensemaker. Snowden realises the requirement for a 
different form of management under these conditions: 
These patterns are, to use the language of complex adaptive systems theory, 
emergent properties of the interactions of the various agents. By increasing 
information flow, variety and “connectiveness” either singly or in 
combination we can break down existing patterns and create the conditions 
under which new patterns will emerge, although the nature of emergence is 
not predictable.44 
The preceding discussion on complexity enables us to move onto emergence, the 
phenomenon in focus. Emergence was highlighted in being a key marker of complexity in the 
explanation of Figure 1. It is suggested when Weick accounts for Follet and Heider’s views 
in dispelling predictability in organisational interactions and traces an interaction in how 
creativity plays out for both human and environmental elements with organisations. Boisot 
points out the emergence of knowledge assets. Snowden implies emergence in discussing his 
Cynefin Model. As can be seen, these organisation and management gurus consider it 
necessary to manage by the dictates of the dynamism of emergence.  
  
                                                
43 Weick, 1995 p. 91 - 105 
44 Snowden, 2002 
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1.6 Introduction to Emergence  
 
Emergence, a key marker of complex systems, is a core phenomenon in the universe. It is not 
a rule but is the manifestation or consequence of the rules of interactions between parts in our 
universe. Christen and Franklin45 , title their piece “The Concept of Emergence in 
Complexity Science”. It is crucial to separate the term “emergence” as used in complexity 
sciences from the lay use of the term. The common connotation of the lay usage of the term, 
distinct from its desired application in this thesis, is frequently used in biological and social 
sciences and relates to notions of coming out of a space, concealment or surfacing into the 
open. Some authors46,point out the difficulty in defining emergence47. Damper48, for 
example, concedes to the difficulty in defining the term “emergence” by saying that, “[i]t 
should be obvious from the foregoing discussion that the term emergence does not easily 
admit of a precise definition." But Goldstein49 gives a more confident definition, saying that 
emergence refers to “the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties 
during the process of self-organization in complex systems.” He goes on further to say that 
“emergence refers to the sudden arising of new patterns and structures possessing new 
properties”.50 
Not all systems are emergent, because the condition for emergence is complexity—a matter 
introduced in Section 1.5. Emergence is a feature of complex systems. Goldstein51 states five 
characteristics of emergent phenomena. The first he points out is that of “radical novelty”52.  
Emergent phenomena manifest features that were not previously observed in the system. It is, 
and deceivingly so, as if these features have no relatedness to the system. Secondly, there is 
“coherence or correlation”53 in the system. There is relatedness over time (horizontally) and 
at specific points in time (vertically). The existence and state of each part of the system can 
                                                
45 Christen and Franklin, 2002 
46 For example, Damper, 2010 and Hempel and Oppenheim, 2008  
47 Christen and Franklin, 2002 
48 Damper, 2010 
49 Goldstein,1999  
50 Goldstein,1999 
51 Goldstein,1999 
52 Goldstein,1999 
53 Goldstein,1999 
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be explained about the other parts. There are integrated wholes that maintain their 
relationship over some period. The third characteristic is that a “global” or “macrolevel”54 
can be identified. There is a property of wholeness when all the parts are considered together. 
There is some significance when the parts of the system are considered together. That the 
system is a “product of a dynamical process”55 is the fourth characteristic. The system 
exhibits a state at a time and is in a perpetual process. It is in flux and not stable. Lastly, 
Goldstein says that the emergent system is “ostensive”56. This means emergence is 
perceivable in its states.  
Morgan's57explains emergence (or “emergent evolution”) as the “creation of new 
properties.”58 In his definition, there are three key words: “properties”, “new” and “creation”. 
By a more detailed discussion of these key concepts, it is possible to grasp the primary topics 
in the concept of emergence. 
To quote Hempel and Oppenheim, 
Generally speaking, the concept of emergence has been used to characterize 
certain phenomena as ‘‘novel,’’ and this not merely in the psychological sense  
of being unexpected, but in the theoretical sense of being unexplainable, or 
unpredictable, on the basis of information concerning the spatial parts or 
other constituents of the systems in which the phenomena occur, and which in 
this context are often referred to as ‘‘wholes.’’59 
 
                                                
54 Goldstein,1999 
55 Goldstein,1999 
56 Goldstein,1999 
57 Morgan L, 1922 
58 Emmeche et al, 1997 
59 Hempel and Oppenheim, 2008  
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Figure 3. Depiction of Emergence (stopped at 5.28 seconds)60 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
60 NetLogo Version 5.0.3, Wilensy, 1999 
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Figure 4. Depiction of Emergence (NetLogo stopped at 5.31seconds)61 
  
                                                
61 NetLogo Version 5.0.3, Wilensy, 1999 
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A conceptualisation of emergence in diagrammatic forms using “NetLogo”62 is seen in the 
illustrations. It is observed that despite there being little variance in the initial input/setting, 
the outcome (i.e. the pattern on the screen) is different. The two images on the black screen 
manifest format and infection variations even though local relationships’ (number of nodes, 
average-node-degrees and initial-outbreak-size63) settings are the same in Figure 3 and Figure 
4. The fundamental observation that is learnt from it is that even if a designer is absent in a 
system, some order can still emerge from chaos. What is required are certain initial 
conditions, and rules in the system to regulate the interaction between elements.  
Chapter 3 explores the topic of emergence in greater detail than has been done here. For now, 
the contribution to our discussion on complexity by Weick, Boisot and Snowden’s theories 
was from an organisational perspective. It is still possible to extend these theories to other 
perspectives. Importantly, all theorists attribute a significant role of emergence and its 
creative nature. Emergence is a creative force that might be considered as explanation for 
innovation. Section 1.7, below, introduces innovation.  
 
1.7 Innovation in Brief 
 
Innovation is a central theme in the knowledge economy64. The theme of innovation is 
implicit in most knowledge management activities and exercises. Innovation is perennial 
problem in knowledge management, because existing already codified knowledge 
conceivably only needs information management, however the creation of new knowledge 
demands an innovation perspective of sorts.  
In Sections 1.4 and 1.5, there were discussions on how organisation and management writers 
invoke complexity and emergence as a zone of creativity and newness and the question is 
how innovation relates to complexity and emergence. 
The World Bank65 identified “effective” and “efficient” innovation as an important pillar in 
the knowledge economy. 
                                                
62 NetLogo Version 5.0.3, Wilensy, 1999 
63 The model used in the example tests the outbreak of a virus. Nodes represent the population coloured 
appropriately to indicate those susceptible, those infected and those with a resistance to the virus. It was 
impractical to stop the ticks (in this NetLogo example, the quantity of ticks is directly related to time) on exactly 
an equal number, but an attempt was made to get the almost same ticks to provide a relevant example. 
64 Used in this study to mean the prominent determination by intellectual property and knowledge of business 
and organisation effectiveness and competitiveness and, alternatively, the scenario within which this occurs. 
65 World Bank, 2003 
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An efficient innovation system of firms, research centers, universities, 
consultants, and other organizations to tap into the growing stock of global 
knowledge, assimilate and adapt it to local needs, and create new 
technology.66 
A more comprehensive discussion on innovation will be made in Chapter 2. The connotation 
of innovation with creativity will suffice in this introduction. Franken67 describes creativity 
as “...the tendency to generate or recognize ideas, alternatives, or possibilities that may be 
useful in solving problems, communicating with others, and entertaining ourselves and 
others.”  
It is inevitable to exclude creativity when one discusses innovation, because without the 
creative process, there are no new ideas to be turned into innovations manifested in either 
tangible or intangible68 artefacts of value. 
 
1.8 Study Format  
 
1. How complex is innovation? This work attempts to define innovation and posit 
it, before any analysis, as a complex notion. Is it possible to draw from other 
theories and extend our understanding of innovation? This is the subject of 
Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 explores innovation in an overview. It is a broad topic and our 
treatment of it will therefore be a synopsis of its description. The discussion will 
focus on those concepts that enable us to analyse it within Complexity Theory.  
2. What is Emmeche et al’s69 perspective on emergence? The authors of the thesis 
that will be analysed in Chapter 3 offer a multiplicity of interesting views and 
present this as their epistemology on emergence. Chapter 3 is dedicated to 
expose their explanation of emergence from several angles. 
                                                
66 World Bank, 2003 
67 Franken, 1993 
68 The notion of the value of intangible assets is explained by Boisot in the same theory of the I-Space discussed 
earlier. 
69 Emmeche et al, 1997 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
3. Chapter 3 addresses cardinal notions of emergence according to Emmeche et 
al70. It will be explained that Emmeche et al’s theory pivots on that of Morgan 
who addressed emergence as “emergent evolution”. It is foundational that 
Emmeche et al. regard emergence as a credible framework for a wide range of 
processes. It underpins our discussion in this thesis. Several views of what 
emergence is, according to Emmeche et al, are provided and developed. It 
becomes apparent that, in their theory, emergence must be opened to various 
perspectives and descriptions. 
This central text on emergence particularly selected for our analysis, that of 
Emmeche et al., explains emergence from a pluralist point of view. That 
plurality in their approach appeals to a motif in this project evident in the 
framing of all the four chapters from heterogeneous resources.  Emmeche et al's 
treatment of emergence condenses the arguments of old and new voices on the 
subject.  
4. What are the themes that can be formed from the review of innovation theories 
and the discussion emergence based on Emmeche et al’s thesis? We will deal 
with these as individual themes in Chapter 4 as we enhance innovation theory. 
5. What is the assessment of emergence in the innovation process? Chapter 5 
concludes the discussion by offering some views and justifying a position that 
exploits acknowledges the role of emergence in a phase in innovation. 
  
                                                
70 Emmeche et al, 1997 
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1.9 Conclusion 
 
Boisot’s71 I-Space significantly benefits our explanation of innovation and complexity.  In 
this chapter, insights into Boisot’s theory were used in the explanation of facets of the 
Complexity Theory as were Snowden’s72  on the Cynefin Model73. 
Two tenets of Weick’s74 sensemaking theory, are brought into our discussion in both this 
chapter and the second. This chapter explored his “enactive of sensible environment”75 
property in a description of complexity.  
Weick’s other contribution, on social creation, is beneficial to the conversation on innovation 
in Chapter 2. 
Dey’s76 “enablers” of innovation appear to facilitate a complexity view of innovation. There 
may be other classifications of “enablers” available in other literature other than Dey’s but 
Dey’s scope has fair coverage. “Enablers” may fit the description of what some other writer 
may call “factors”.  
One other theorists selected in the presentation of innovation is Holland77. His discussion on 
emergence weaves-in notions of innovation and emergence. This is doubly significant to a 
discussion such as the one here where one concept is being presented considered as a model 
another. 
Rogers et al’s78 Diffusion of Innovation Model is central to this thesis as it enables us to 
transcend the limits of the traditional treatment of innovation and facilitates a clear view of 
innovation’s complexity whilst priming the discussion for the synthesis of concepts in 
Chapter 4. The perspective of Rogers et al complement those of Dey’s in and assesses 
innovation’s consumer’s. Suffice to it perceives the contribution of consumers and their role 
in innovation. 
                                                
71 Boisot, 1998 
72 Snowden, 2002 
73 Gladwell, 2000 
74 Weick, 1995 
75 Weick, 1995.p. 30 
76 Dey, 2012 
77 Holland, 1998 
78 Rogers et al, 2004 
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The theory on emergence is broken down into several themes, each discussed in turn and 
primed for assessment with Chapter 2 concepts in Chapter 4. This chapter begins to create an 
anticipation of the themes that feature in Chapter 4. The criticality of the notion of 
supervenience in the emergence debate, hopefully, is also addressed in this chapter.  
We started this chapter by stating the purpose of this study. The discussed the complexity 
theory and emergence. It extended this to Weick, Boisot and Snowden whose perspectives 
focus on complexity, emergence and the management of information, knowledge, and the 
environment. This was followed by a brief introduction of innovation and its association with 
creativity. This chapter also featured a discussion on creativity and its relationship to 
emergence. Chapter 2 will provide an overview of innovation and discuss it using different 
theories  
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Chapter 2 
Innovation: An Overview 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A major theme in this thesis is to contribute to innovation theory, since there are many 
different conceptions of innovation, we need a working description of the type of innovation 
well primed for the discussion we target to have in Chapter 4. There are many perspectives 
on innovation at various levels of analysis. An attempt is made here to provide an overview 
of innovation literature from various perspectives in order to analyse it in complexity terms. 
Theories, like those of Chesbrough, Dey, Holland and Weick have been selected as 
representative ones to use in this exercise.  
The first section will use Dey’s79 views on how innovation can be classified into five types. It 
will be summarised, after adding Dershin’s80 insights, how these types of innovation qualify 
for analysis in complexity terms. The next focus, following through on Dey81, is to discuss 
the enablers of innovation. These are factors that make innovation happen or speeds it in 
organisation. Other insights, including Doss’82 will contribute to some clarity in that section. 
Holland’s83 deals with a description of an innovation process. Holland places attention on 
metaphor. It is the first of three that are included in this chapter. The others are 
Chesbrough’s84 Open Innovation and Weick’s85 Social Creation. 
The final discuss will be on the Diffusion of Innovation Model (DIM)86. It must be clarified 
that the DIM is not a comprehensive description of the innovation process. The model 
functions to analyse the spread of novel ideas. Discussing the DIM is an attempt to analyse 
                                                
79 Dey, 2012 
80 Dershin, 2011 
81 Dey, 2009 
82 Doss, 2013 
83 Holland, 1998 
84 Chesbrough, 2006 
85 Weick, 1995 
86 Rogers et al, 2004 
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how customers interact with an innovation or new product. Rogers et al describe the DIM as 
follows, 
... (it) is concerned with change occurring among human agents or nodes in 
an interconnected network of communications, yet it can easily incorporate 
nonhuman intervention devices such as mass media or electronic technology 
as reactive agents (with reactivity defined as sensitivity to change)87. 
One may debate that a certain tenet of the DIM, scaling, is metaphoric of the innovation 
process.  
 
2.2 Types of Innovation 
 
Dey88 cites the diverse types of innovation below. These are dealt with below. 
 
2.2.1 Product innovation 
...new and better products that your organisation can provide to customers.89 
This is the most common conceptualisation of innovation. A new product is brought to the 
market as a new consumer attraction. It is brought onto the market to displace another by its 
more superior and desirable qualities. 
2.2.2 Service innovation 
...new and better service offerings and delivery of those services to 
customers.90  
This is related to the first type but applies to businesses that offer services as opposed to 
products91. In the knowledge economy, there is a growing market for services. More and 
more millionaires are being made from knowledge-based businesses. 
 
2.2.3 Process innovation 
...better ways of doing things that save time and/or money.92  
Henry Ford did not invent the car, he innovated the car-manufacturing process by introducing 
the assembly line in the manufacturing of the Ford Model T. Innovating business processes 
leads to better efficiency in production process or service delivery. This normally leads to 
                                                
87 Rogers et al, 2004 
88 Dey, 2012 
89 Dey, 2012 
90 Dey, 2012 
91 In a sense, an offered “service” is regarded, in commercial terms, as being a “product” as well 
92 Dey, 2012 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
 
gains by the organisation in the reduction of production costs and time. The best process 
innovation ultimately results in better cost for quality to the customer. 
2.2.4 Business model innovation 
...improving the way your organisation creates, delivers and extracts value 
from customers.93  
This form of innovation entails a shift of focus in the business but requires foresight as to 
which product and services are likely to achieve the most gain in the medium to long term. It 
“is a specification describing how an organization fulfils its purpose”94.  
Descriptions of business model innovation by some sources, because they seem to address 
broader organisation aspects, appear to fit those for strategy. The difference seems to be the 
limitation of business model innovation to business, in other words, the relationship between 
customers and value95. 
Dey’s view is very similar to Drucker’s quoted here96 saying 
...a business model answers the following questions: Who is your customer, 
what does the customer value and how do you deliver value at an appropriate 
cost? 
The questions have answers that are dynamic. This is so since the customers, their values and 
modes of value delivery are dynamic phenomena. So, innovating a business model is an on-
going “exercise”97. 
Google is an example98 of a company that benefitted from business model innovation 
In 2003, the company launched its AdWords program which allowed 
businesses to advertise to people searching for things on Google.com. Almost 
overnight, Google took the leap from popular search tool to advertising 
juggernaut. 
The tool, Google.com, change very little but extended itself from being an internet search 
tool to being also an advertising platform. 
2.2.5 Organisational innovation 
...improving the way you manage and engage your employees.99  
                                                
93 Dey, 2012 
94 Rouse, 2013 
95 The theme of “value” is explored in latter chapters and exposed as critical to the notion of innovation. 
96 Rouse, 2013 
97 The word “exercise” offers the closest description but is itself not precise as it implies programmed and 
conscious action. Business innovation involves unprogrammed and unconscious action too.  
98 Walley, 2010 
99 Dey, 2012 
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An illustration is Jack Welch’s management approach that revolutionised management of 
people in organisations. He developed the concept of an organisation without boundaries. 
organisation. This involved the notion of removing hierarchical structures and viewing 
everyone in the organisation as a source of ideas. 
In the same vein, Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard100, that emerged as one of the 
most comprehensive and well-used organisational management tools, is an illustration of 
organisational innovation. Kaplan and Norton’s ideas were useful in changing views about 
the way organisational objectives are communicated and monitored in organisations. This is a 
major contribution to strategy planning and implementation. 
2.2.6 Brand and communication innovation 
...new and better ways of representing your organisation.101  
This kind of innovation has marketing and/or publicity functions. The election of United 
States President Barack Obama in 2008 was preceded by innovative campaigning that used 
social media platforms.  
Obama enjoyed a groundswell of support among, for lack of a better term, the 
Facebook generation. He will be the first occupant of the White House to have 
won a presidential election on the Web... This election was the first in which 
all candidates—presidential and congressional—attempted to connect directly 
with American voters via online social networking sites like Facebook and 
MySpace. It has even been called the "Facebook election." It is no coincidence 
that one of Obama's key strategists was 24-year-old Chris Hughes, a 
Facebook cofounder. It was Hughes who masterminded the Obama 
campaign's highly effective Web blitzkrieg—everything from social networking 
sites to podcasting and mobile messaging.102 
Brand and communication innovation appears to be a response to shifting communication 
medium preferences by the target group. It therefore capitalises on communication media and 
competences thereof and is complex. 
                                                
100 Kaplan, 2010  
101 Dey, 2012 
 
102 Dutta and Fraser, 2008 
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Dershin103 proposes managing innovation as a complex adaptive system from his conclusion 
that innovation is non-linear in nature and process: 
The term ‘complex’ applies to innovation because of the unpredictability of 
outcomes, their dependence on initial conditions, and the powerful effect of 
interaction and feedback among many variables. ‘Adaptive’ applies because 
approaches to an innovation challenge shift and change over time as the 
system moves from one state of knowledge to another. ‘System’ is applicable 
because current thinking has progressed from viewing innovation as relying 
on the work of isolated sources to appreciating the interconnectedness of the 
various sources 
 
2.2.7 Summary 
In summarising Dey and Dershin’s insights above, it can be observed that innovation, in all 
its forms, is about improvement. The focus, each time, seems to be a target of the business’ 
improvement of its delivery. This is evident in the assertion made regarding process 
innovation that innovation is worthwhile when it considers the quality cost to the customer. 
In discussing business model innovation, it was important to note the dynamism entailed in 
the process. The process, in its ideal practice, has no end. Awareness and input of the 
customer’s perspective are also critical. 
Brand and communication innovation is sensitive to the target group. This type of innovation 
must regard environmental changes and media at the disposal of, and preferred by, those that 
the organisation is targeting. In the knowledge economy, these media and technology evolve 
and can be disrupted. 
Organisational innovation, even though it is about the organisation’s employees, likewise 
demands an environmental focus and entails improvement. Employees’ expectations will 
certainly not be static and responsive, in turn, to the environment employees exist in. 
Dershin’s remarks on the way to manage innovation will find credence in Dey’s description 
of the type of innovation: innovation must be perceived as complex and non-linear. The 
complexity of innovation can initially be appreciated by discussing Dey’s enablers of 
innovation. What Dey proposes as enablers are not exhaustive but what are included are 
sufficient to spell out innovation’s complexity. 
 
                                                
103 Dershin, 2011 
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2.3 Dey’s Enablers of Innovation 
 
The views from Dey provide a significant explanation of how, innovation, like most 
phenomena, will be influenced and determined by factors regarding its rate of progress or 
success. According to Dey104, the factors below enable innovation. 
2.3.1 Challenge 
Bingham relates challenges to strategy and refers to how organisational objectives can be 
used to articulate them. He also endorses a “challenge culture”105. There are similarities 
between this culture and one that is critical of it and continuously questions why it carries out 
its activities in the manner it does. When objectives are outlined and reviewed periodically, 
organisations action must be aligned to them. This maintains dynamism in an organisation 
and an improved culture.  
 
2.3.2 Leadership 
The first critical observation to make in the opinion of Hill106 is that innovation “is led”. This 
implies some authoritative107 guidance and support108. This involves long-term plans and 
clarifying important and critical organisation focus. Leadership manifests in strategy109 
amongst other organisational aspects. The depth of an organisation’s innovation depends on 
how “the leader(ship) interacts and perceives innovation.”110 
2.3.3 Strategy 
An organisation’s strategy is espoused in its values, missions and visions. A strategy may 
prefer growth or consolidation. This means the organisation must adapt to its environment or 
attempt to influence its environment in an offensive or defensive manner in view of 
competition. Ultimately, strategy demands some form of innovation. In most cases, 
                                                
104 Dey, 2009 
105 Bingham, 2012 
106 Hill, 2014 
107 There is a need to explain away the negative implication here of the word “authoritative”. What is implied is 
guidance from designated organisational heads. Opinions in the previous discussion on freedom must be left 
intact. In fact, Hill notes that leadership in innovation must be perceived differently from other forms of 
leadership, for example in crises, the political and military forms and so on. She endorses that an “inverted 
hierarchy appears to be more effective”.  
108 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain “leadership”. There are different views that have contributed 
to the topic. It is best described within specific circumstances and not confined to those who have oversight on 
others, managers and boards necessarily. It may suffice to explain “leadership” as more sustained and long-term 
than “management”, less about control but involving the development, instilling and explanation of vision.  
109 See section 2.3.3 
110 Gumusluoglu and İlsev, 2009 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
innovation is either on methods or the organisation’s product111. Strategy also determines 
the degree of this innovation through its influence on organisational focus and financing of 
action.  
2.3.4 Culture 
Culture refers to, “patterns for behaviour (sic) not patterns of behaviour (sic)”112. Culture is a 
pattern meant to be a framework for habits. It is a template within which behaviour is 
regarded as normal. Culture therefore has significant boundary effects on creative behaviour. 
It may affect both creativity and diffusion of innovation113. One source puts it remarkably 
when they make the revealing comment about culture that “the organizational culture acts as 
a filter through which strategies are defined and the performance determined.”114 
Also, Doss115, states that three tenets of good organizational culture for innovation namely 
trust, diversity, and a proper attitude to risk: An important facet of an innovative culture is the 
amount of trust placed in organisational members to put forth ideas. Trust is built by the 
leadership and gives employees confidence to act freely. Trust enables creative thinking 
without the worry of retribution. It is promoted in an environment where leadership consider 
themselves as facilitators of innovation and creativity and not regularly in the forefront. 
The observation by Dey on diversity is related to the identification of heterogeneity by 
Rogers et al. in the “Diffusion of Innovation Model” (DIM)116. The variation here is that 
Dey’s focus is on the creative and development process.  
[It is diversity] of people, points of view, ideas, ethics, and beliefs.  It is 
axiomatic that innovation requires iteration, constant challenge, testing, 
playing, and randomness. Innovative organizations require leadership that 
values and welcomes diversity.117 
                                                
111 These are notions, albeit over-summarised, dealt with comprehensively by De Wit and Meyer (2010) under 
four broad strategic foci viz, process, content, context and purpose. 
112 Van Alstyne and Logan, 2007 
113 The diffusion of innovation is discussed in section 2.7. 
114 Gumusluoglu and İlsev, 2009 
115 Doss, 2013 
116 Rogers et al, 2004. DIM is discussed in detail in Section 2.7. 
117 Doss, 2013 
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The actions that Dey consider as axiomatic118 are only possible with a sizeable and diverse-
cultured group. In a way, Dey’s remarks here extend Weick’s ideas119 in his sensemaking 
theory when he describes role of individuals in organisations in shaping realities. 
It is often asserted that ventures that entail substantial risks often attract high returns. High 
return potential is what makes innovations attractive to funders. Trending world economic 
fundamentals dictated by globalisation are becoming more and more unstable and complex. 
The other dimension to locate risk, in another form, is within organisations and the 
atmosphere created for innovation. Since the creative process entails internal and non-
customer related financial resources, the process can be likened to risk-taking, trial and error 
and failure. Dey clarifies the role of risk by saying: 
Innovative organizations encourage risk, and understand failure.  Without 
leadership that understands and contextualizes failure, risk will be a negative 
organizational value. Yet again, leadership is necessary, but insufficient... 
Where organizational systems link personal success to the absence of failure, 
there will be diminished risk taking. 
2.3.5 Corporate Processes/Standards 
There are many ways of looking at corporate processes. Most corporate processes are about 
how data, information and knowledge are central in a business120. Figure 7 illustrates the role 
of data, information and knowledge in decision-making. The information and knowledge are 
more often, and in discerning organisations, captured and codified in: 
1. Best practises – when the organisation commits to use optimum methods in their 
tasks.  
2. Benchmarking – when the organisation sets objectives to be equivalent to a 
market leader’s standards with the aim of even surpassing those standards 
3. The basic principle of benchmarking consists of identifying a point of 
comparison, called the benchmark, against which everything else can be 
compared.121 
                                                
118 Interpreted to mean: being evident but without proof or evidence. 
119 Weick,1997. Explained in Chapter 1 and later in Section 2.6. 
120 French et al, 2009 
121 Ettorchi-Tardy et al, 2012 
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4. Standardisation – this often requires an organisation to meet the standards laid 
out in a “code of practise”. Standards are often generic and apply to specific 
organisational functions like safety, quality, financial reporting and so forth. 
5. Procedures – the organisation sets out “how-to” statements that must be adhered 
to in their work processes. They are set to ensure consistency and may be useful 
tools in benchmarking, standardisation and forth. Although these may result in 
sound organisation122, they may become obstacles to innovation and 
mechanise123business activities and decision-making. 
2.3.6 Finance 
Finance is a resource that certainly determines the success or rate of innovation. Innovation 
requires finance and a model below indicates the stages at which various sources ideally 
intervene. The axis label “Cash Flow”, also traces stages of development of the concept. In 
the discussion on the DIM in Section 2.7, the role of finance in innovation will also be 
highlighted. At times, innovations fail because of lack of money. This may happen even 
when they have a selling point and show excellent value potential. In summary, before mass 
adoption of an innovation, funding must be available to sustain the creative and development 
processes. Thereafter, and after mass adoption, innovation is sustained by adopters, or 
customers. 
The “Start-up Life Cycle”124 presents an opportunity to analyse, in graphic form, the role of 
financing in commercial innovation.  Placed in this discussion, this presentation can be 
criticised for simplifying commercial innovation financing dynamics. They are certainly 
more complex and not too yielding to reductionist analysis. The representation should be 
accorded some credit for standing as a model to aiding our understanding of the various 
responses capital views novel ideas. It aids planning and strategy.  
  
                                                
122 In the verb-sense 
123 Borrowing a term here from Morgan, 1997, on the machine metaphor. In the same, Morgan also states (p. 
217) that “ways of seeing become ways of not seeing”. Procedures, policies or standardised business process 
demonstrate ways of seeing. “Groupthink, a term coined by social psychologist Janis (1972), occurs when a 
group makes faulty decisions because group pressures lead to a deterioration of “mental efficiency, reality 
testing, and moral judgment” (p. 9).  Groups affected by groupthink ignore alternatives and tend to take 
irrational actions that dehumanize other groups.  A group is especially vulnerable to groupthink when its 
members are similar in background, when the group is insulated from outside opinions...” 
124 Gromov, 2014 
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Figure 5. The Start-up Life Cycle125 
 
  
                                                
125 Gromov, 2014 
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The second point, more specific to this discussion, is the view that the model can be used 
alongside Rogers et al’s to analyse the other component of innovation that Rogers et al do not 
break down very well in their DIM: the role of money in the development and emergence of 
novel ideas and how quickly these ideas become commercial or renowned.  
 The “Start-Up Life Cycle” traces the innovation from the creative stages, called, in this 
study, the seed phase126. When compared with the DIM, this may correspond with the 
innovation’s initiator’s action towards the early adopters. The seed phase can be compared to 
the stage before the inflection point in the DIM Model.127  
A critical stage is identified as the “Valley of Death”. It marks a duration where most 
concepts die or are aborted. This may be from, for instance, their lack of feasibility, lack of 
conviction of financiers, a realisation of likely lack of return on investment and so on. 
The cash flow follows a distinct “J-Curve” pattern over time, with an initial 
drop at the seed stage (The “Valley of Death), related to the financial 
resources spent on the proof of the business concept. For enterprises requiring 
significant R&D or product development effort, the “Valley” can be much 
deeper and longer. If the business emerges from the “Valley” and becomes 
established, the cash flow turns positive and the business gradually generates 
market momentum and moves to the early-growth and expansion stages.128 
Notably there is recognition of distinct types of funders along the curve in the model from the 
“seed” stage right through to expansion. It can be argued that the representation does not 
imply the confinement of a type of funder to a distinct stage. Our interest is the induction of 
these funders at the stages they get involved. An early observation can be made of the 
potential comparability between this model and Roger et al’s DIM. 
Having dealt with the types of innovation and the factors that influence it, the discussion must 
be extended by explaining the innovation process using the views of Holland, immediately 
below. Later, Chesbrough and Weick’s views on innovation will also be explained to 
illustrate innovation in action.  
Holland, it will be noted, uses mathematical yet also literary approach in his description. 
 
 
 
                                                
126 In Fig. 5. the seed phase is where “Seed Capital” features. 
127 The DIM is reviewed in section 2.7 
128 (ECE/CECI/7) United Nations, 2009  
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2.4 Holland’s Innovation Process 
 
2.4.1 Metaphor  
Holland’s129 inclusion in this section is to demonstrate creativity in soft settings. The 
metaphor may be regarded as a root or seed of innovation. Holland deals with forms of social 
innovation from an interesting angle, namely social creation spawned by metaphor.  
The “source” and “target”130 concept is metaphorical of innovation. It illustrates instances of 
innovation. The intention is to present a view from Holland of where innovation comes from. 
A review of innovation in terms of its types and a description of what enables it was made131. 
In discussing Holland, we attempt to answer the question: Where do innovations come from? 
How are the ideas developed? And other notions attendant to these questions.  
In Holland’s description, metaphors have two parts, a “source” and a “target”. The third 
aspect is the association and meaning between the source and the target. The likeness of a 
model and a metaphor relate to the three aspects. A model is derived from a description, data, 
and information that shape it. 
Holland quotes Morgan also uses the term metaphor. He refers to metaphor in a “broad 
sense… (to) …include similes and other tropes.” 132 
Holland notes the role of perception and how experiences becomes a “glass” that we see 
through. Experiences are catalysts, he notes. The observer views in the context of 
experiences. 
Perception is altered by the metaphoric conjunctions... responses depend 
partially on individual experiences... (it is further tuned by the context in 
which it appears, which includes both the surrounding subject matter and the 
observer’s experience...(it) catalyzes, and stands in place of, this complicated 
interaction.133  
Perhaps one of the most insightful of the notions Holland explores is captured in his 
quotation of Eco134who says: 
                                                
129 Holland, 1998 
130 Holland, 1998 p. 206 
131 See Sections 2.2 and 2.3 
132 Holland, I998 p. 207 
133 Holland, 1998 p. 209 
134 Umberto Eco is an Italian “writer, linguist and philosopher”  
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...Metaphor...consists in connecting remote Notions & finding Similitude in 
things dissimilar, then Metaphor, the most acute and far-fetched among 
Tropes, is the only one capable of producing Wonder...135  
The establishment of likeness or relationships in variant notions, what we may (and indeed as 
Holland does) label combinations136, offers good opportunity of creating what Eco calls 
“Wonder”. 
When this concept is explored and explained alongside that of models, according to Holland, 
there the possibility “to see new connections”.137  
The implication from the foregoing, when one considers them in the framework of 
innovation, appears to be that models and metaphors lie at the centre of creative processes. 
2.4.2 Building Blocks 
The construction analogy in the use of the phrase “building blocks”138 by Holland is curious. 
Firstly, this concept is about combinations and relatedness. The ability to select “building 
blocks” and having the skill on how they fit alongside each other is what Holland regards as 
constituting a discipline. It is critical for the blocks to “have undergone testing and selection 
in the hands of many practitioners”139. Also critical is to point that these “blocks” are not of 
the same kind. They are different yet related. So here Holland is emphasising that creation is 
not about using the same blocks. He cites the constitution of physics as a discipline and 
provides that it entails and understanding of not only  
...motion, mass, and energy, and the forces that transform them (but it also 
entails learning) tools like the differential calculus...All disciplines have 
similar requirements (of building blocks)140 
The conclusion by Holland to the fact that “[d]isciplines are like metaphors”141 and we can 
identify building blocks underlying disciplines. He concedes that “we cannot model the 
                                                
135 Holland, 1998 p. 209. The quotation capitalises the first letters of notion, similitude, metaphor, tropes and 
wonder. It is as if Wonder et al are people or places. Umberto Eco writes from a novelist, literary and semiotic 
position. He is interested in meaning and likely to be hyperbolic in instances where stress and emphasis are 
required. 
136 Holland’s thesis revels in the matter of combination.  
137 Holland, 1998 p. 210 
138 Holland, 1998 p. 212 
139 Holland, 1998 p. 212 
140 Holland, 1998 p. 212 
141 Holland, 1992 p. 212. Or “building blocks and associated techniques” 
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innovation process [and we have] have a long way to go, [because innovation] has a 
component that must go beyond the stream of consciousness.” 
It is not a frequent occurrence to discover “new building blocks”. It is for this reason, 
according to Holland, that innovations emanate from the “combination” of old or “well-tried 
blocks”. A similar block may spawn variant forms of innovation as pointed out by Holland 
when he says that “even when people share the same building blocks, different innovations 
can arise.”142 Furthermore, building blocks are tested iteratively as constituents of models 
and “combined to provide novel insights.”143 When there is “familiarity with several nearby 
disciplines” what is enabled is the “perception of what’s nearby”. That perception “is a part 
of that mysterious trait we call insight”.144  
Chesbrough145, on the other hand, is interested in how organisations must consider 
themselves as open systems in their approach to innovation. 
 
2.5 Chesbrough’s Open Innovation Concept 
 
The notion of open innovation includes co-conception, innovation with customers, markets 
for ideas, crowd-sourcing, open-source, co-development amongst other types of participation. 
We can use Chesbrough’s conceptualisation of both closed innovation and closed innovation 
to bring clarity to our focus: open innovation. Chesbrough, below, first explains the opposite 
concept, “closed innovation”146 and remarks that it 
...says successful innovation requires control. Companies must generate their 
own ideas and then develop them, build them, market them, distribute them, 
service them, finance them and support them on their own. This paradigm 
counsels firms to be strongly self-reliant, because one cannot be sure of the 
quality, availability, and capability of others’ ideas 147 
The apparent characteristics of closed innovation confine it to internal organisational 
intellectual resources. There appears to be a concern that external input poses a threat of 
                                                
142 Holland, 1998 p. 214 
143 Holland, 1998  
144 Holland, 1998 p. 213 
145 Chesbrough, 2006 
146 Chesbrough, 2006 
147 Chesbrough, 2006 p. xx 
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compromising the quality of innovation. The organisation is trapped in a fear of what is not 
outside and relies only on internal resources, expertise and competence. An assumption is 
made to regard external ideas as unsettling. The proposal is that this becomes the case due to 
at least three reasons. 
Firstly, out of ignorance, those leading the organisation may leave out the input of external 
stakeholders. This is often the case in very hierarchical and rigid organisations that are 
managed in a traditional manner. 
The other reason organisations chose not to engage external stakeholders is their hope of 
avoiding time-wasting administrative hassles inherent in sifting too many ideas. It is true that 
the nature and form of input from outside may get to the organisation requiring to be 
organised to be meaningful. It is difficult to communicate and find adequate compliance for a 
standardised form of input from outside. It is easier to achieve input in a required form when 
an organisation deals with its employees.148 So, there may exist a fear of the potential 
inability to make sense of the consequent chaos the input may bring or cause. 
Lastly, inherent with openness is an exposure of an organisation’s intellectual assets to those 
outside its system. In the first chapter, we briefly discussed Boisot’s treatment of intellectual 
assets in his theory on the I-Space. Most organisations, as a strategy desire to protect internal 
intellectual assets from their competitors. This is an understandable concern when good 
discretion is lacking on what to communicate or reveal.  
Innovation processes, with this mindset, are then closed to external participation without any 
worry of the missing valuable and impartial value-creating customer, market and other views. 
Chesbrough proceeds to explaining open innovation and says it 
...can be understood as the antithesis of the traditional vertical integration 
model where internal research and development activities lead to internally 
developed products that are then distributed by the firm... Open Innovation is 
the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal 
innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, 
respectively. Open Innovation ... assumes that firms can and should use 
external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to 
market, as they look to advance their technology 149 
                                                
148 It is perhaps expecting too much for an organisation to require structured input from a complex system as 
we should assume stakeholders to be! 
149 Chesbrough, 2006,  
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Open innovation endorses an open system view. The organisation is a system contributing to 
innovation. Innovation itself, on the other hand is a system sensitive to internal and external 
organisational aspects. True value is perceived to come from the interaction of internal 
organisational innovation processes. Innovation is a dialectical process where ideas bounce 
and forth between the organisation and environmental entities such as customers, the market, 
suppliers and other stakeholders. There is confidence that such interaction is worth the threat 
of losing intellectual information which, in any case, finds its way out encoded in the 
“product”, employees and so on. The more this process is facilitated, the more accelerated the 
innovation. 
Closed innovation suits the mechanical, reductionist paradigm. If products and services must 
be beneficial and competitive, they must address multiple concerns of diverse groups. Open 
innovation emphasises heterogeneous actors to achieve this. 
Weick’s focus is on that heterogeneity and addresses it in what he terms “social creation”150. 
 
 
2.6 Weick’s Social Creation 
 
Weick151 tackles the notion of social creativity within his sensemaking theory152. 
Commenting on organisational sensemaking, he quotes Putman who explains that 
The interpretive approach to organizations is codified as the study of 
subjective, intersubjective, and socially created meanings that create and 
recreate social structures through communication153  
The perspective here according to Putman is to view organisations in three dimensions: the 
subjective, intersubjective and the social and how meaning is constituted, and in turn, 
transform the make-up of the group through just the transmission messages. 
Weick picks the subject up in his own formulation and clarifies it. 
Organizations are adaptive social forms. As intersubjective forms, they create, 
preserve, and implement the innovations that arise from intimate 
                                                
150 Weick, 1995 
151 Weick, 1995 
152 Weick, 1995 
153 Weick, 1995 p. 68 
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contact...Intersubjectivity is emergent upon the interchange and synthesis of 
two, or more, communicating selves.154  
And the process is not vanity: it is progression towards a superior and more useful status. It is 
continuous and implied within the sensemaking process itself. 
When we view organizations as entities that move continuously between 
intersubjectivity and generic subjectivity, there seems to be a common core 
that enables us to represent the setting in which organizational sensemaking 
occurs. Steps toward a composite picture.155  
The organisation is a system that contains units acting maybe differently but the set of actions 
formats a larger sphere. Weick draws on Czarniawska-Joerges insights about this creative 
process: “Organizations are nets of collective action, undertaken to shape the world and 
human lives”.156  
The preceding comments are insightful and identify this kind of sensemaking within the 
province of collective rather than singular action. But Weick must point out that individual 
ingenuity should find a place even within control and protocol issues. He presents the activity 
of balancing the two as a tension.  
The active, ongoing management of transitions is the reason why 
organizations are often viewed as tension systems... and why the dominant 
tension is often labelled...as tension between innovation (intersubjective) and 
control (generic subjectivity).157  
So, this sensemaking process is not smooth and incorporates a degree of openness. The 
consequence is therefore ambiguity rather than certainty. So Weick elaborates the 
phenomenon very well when he says 
It is the very openness associated with this perspective that makes distinctions 
between out there and in here inventions rather than discoveries, that results 
in people creating their own constraints, and that triggers the strange 
sequence in which outputs become the occasion to define retrospectively what 
could have been plausible inputs and throughputs. In short, as we move from 
that which is rational, through that which is natural, to that which is open, we 
                                                
154 Weick, 1995 p. 72 
155 Weick, 1995 p. 75 
156 Weick, 1995 p. 74 
157 Weick, 1995  
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concurrently move from structures, processes, and environments that are less 
ambiguous to those that are more so.158  
Stepping away from subjectivity, and past rationality, the consequent focus may be 
ambiguity. This is because the amount of information that is acquired through the various 
activities, incidents and processes accumulates to the point of overwhelming our ability to 
analyse it. There is an increase in information and this gives rise to ambiguity. 
The phenomenon of ambiguity, amongst others, is perceived from another dimension in the 
DIM. 
  
                                                
158 Weick 1995,  
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2.7 Diffusion of Innovation Model (DIM) 
 
2.7.1 DIM Definition 
In several instances before this section, and especially in the discussion about the role of 
finance in innovation, reference was made to the DIM159.  
The DIM160 presents an opportunity to view innovation as an emergent phenomenon. 
Chiefly, it analyses how customers, termed “adopters” by Rogers et al, engage or disengage 
with a new idea or product. As can be seen, Rogers et al offer an analysis on the diversity of 
the adopter group. Rogers et al. explain the model as follows and say that 
.... innovations model (DIM) is concerned with how innovations, defined as 
ideas or practices that are perceived as new, are spread (Rogers et al, 2003). . 
Diffusion is the process through which an innovation spreads via 
communication channels over time among the members of a social system. 
This is a social sciences definition of diffusion, one that is not to be confused 
with the thermodynamic definition of diffusion.161 
The phrase “over time” has an evolution notion about it. We note also that the subjects here 
are “members of a social system”. There is also a perception of the concepts as “new”. The 
phenomena that calls for focus, are “ideas or practices”. This is a wide description and takes 
in products. Protracted developments are a feature of the DIM. Rogers et al. calls each of 
these developments a “process” and brings out that the subjects of their process are “members 
of a social system”. We ascribe a special interest to “systems”. They seek to divert the 
discussion from physics by divorcing it from “thermodynamics”.  
2.7.2 Diffusion 
The concept of diffusion in systems, innovation and system flows is dealt with by Boisot162. 
We dealt with Boisot’s I-Space in Chapter 1 in some detail. The DIM is about the spread of 
ideas and practises in systems, albeit social in this case. 
The balance of the argument is one that proves that the movement of information can be 
likened to a process of innovation. Ideas are new information or novel concepts having the 
potential for adoption and with the potential to improve a situation. In this sense, a discussion 
                                                
159 For instance, in Subsection 2.3.6 
160 Rogers et al, 2004 
161 Rogers et al, 2004 
162 Boisot, 1998 
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on how ideas are adopted stands to benefit from a theory, like Boisot’s on the flow of 
information. 
2. 7.3 Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity is a property that characterises most social systems. It grades variety within a 
system. In DIM, Rogers et al. acknowledge the heterogeneous nature in some of the areas and 
it is important to note the significance of this property to social systems. 
Agent heterogeneity refers to the degree of heterogeneity that agents, the basic 
units of complexity, are assumed to have. Traditionally sciences have assumed 
agents to be homogeneous – all atoms or molecules alike, for example (Suppe, 
1977; Casti, 1997). In contrast, the social sciences have progressively 
emphasised the uniqueness of agents for purposes of analysis within a 
discipline (e.g., sociologists do not assume all social entities are 
homogeneous), instead focusing on the elemental properties of agents as 
increasingly heterogeneous, more clearly defined, and more distant from the 
properties of adjoining agent.163. 
Traditional sciences’ notions obey mechanistic principles and reductionism. Agents must be 
perceived as individuals, even if they share a common background or identity, as in students 
of customers. They present a mixture of traits, preferences, personalities and so on.  
2.7.4 Diffusion scales  
In regarding broader and narrower behaviour, Rogers et al. refer to these as scales:  
Diffusion theory... looks at both the fine and global scales of behavior and the 
relationships between them, and it illustrates emergent behavior and feedback 
when aggregates of individual behavior scale up to a similar behavior on a 
system level. Beginning with the level of local interactions, the fine scale, 
diffusion takes place through a network consisting of individual units 
(potential adopters). The adopter unit can be an individual or an organization 
(“individuals” hereafter, for simplicity).164 
The noun of choice here “scale”, contextually refers to zones and dimensions if not areas of 
focus. More so when these “scales” are said to have “relationships”. That they have “local 
interactions”, the fine scale is an interesting phenomenon in a systems sense. “Organisation”, 
in this social sense, and the context of this discussion, is also conjured.  
                                                
163 Lichtenstein and McKelvey, 2011 
164 Rogers et al, 2004 
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The fine scale apparently does not relate to individuals only. Rogers et al. relatively speak of 
scales. When a group’s behaviour is subjective to institutional or organisational behaviour, 
the smaller unit’s behaviour is regarded as the fine scale. The theory does not treat the fine 
scale lightly. Individuals account, as an aggregate, for global scale behaviour 
Diffusion theory is similarly dependent on networks in which individuals 
interact locally with their neighbours... 
Individual adopters are not usually cognizant of their contribution to a higher-
scale order; rather, they make their decisions about innovations on the basis 
of their own perceived circumstances...network adoption of innovations is 
maintained despite population turnover, often for generations, even as 
different system levels influence one another. 
In addition to the influence of individuals on each other in a contemporary setting, there is 
also a trans-generational effect. Social systems inherit versions of old innovations and carry 
them over. They borrow from old innovations. 
The macro-scale: the innovation diffuses. Micro-scale behaviours—frequent 
instances of adoption—create macro-scale phenomena, such as the 
establishment of a consumer product standard (set up to say later this is like 
an emergent property/phenomenon). The often-cited triumph of VHS over Beta 
is a case in point.165 
The perspective preferred in DIM is bifurcated outlook of scales. At the micro scale, there is 
assimilation of behaviour between individuals. The macro scale illustrates the wholesome 
picture and shows behaviour of the social system. It illustrates the success of the diffused 
behaviour as a widely-accepted trend. 
Diffusion theory...looks at both the fine and global scales of behavior and the 
relationships between them...166 
There are two distinct scales, the fine or local and global scales. It is insinuated here that, in 
DIM, there are relationships between them. There are diverse types of adopters and they 
comprise sub-units within the group. The group is therefore a unit manifesting global 
behaviour. Members within the group have individual influences on the adoption of 
innovation. This is because it diffuses through them. They are micro-players. 
                                                
165 Rogers et al, 2004 
166 Rogers et al, 2004 
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Each individual can be self-located in one of the five adopter categories 
(innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards) and 
the network provides connections through which an innovation spreads...167 
There is clear scaling in processes within the group of potential adopters. A key process 
incited by early adopters is perturbation168. This creates a churning of ideas within the group 
itself as if it is an incubator of ideas. The unit itself has interesting characteristics. Amongst 
these, “above-average network-connectivity”, “reactivity” and heterogeneity169 
Another key process, an interesting irony pointed out by Rogers et al, is a formation of 
innovation occurring within early adopters and during diffusion. It is an innovation of the 
innovation170.  
We can state a further characteristic of the adopters group: homophily. Its influence and 
function in this group is explained by Rogers et al. this way, 
Homophily is the tendency to selectively interact with and learn from 
culturally-similar others, so that degree of homophily refers to the extent of 
prior affinity among network actors, including proneness to accept innovation. 
Greater homophily allows for greater ease of diffusion (although as 
previously stated, a degree of heterophily regarding an innovation is required 
for reactivity), while high degrees of heterophily raise barriers to diffusion. At 
extreme values, high heterophily makes diffusion almost impossible, as several 
studies illustrate...171 
Heterophily must be found to be in primary level phenomena, physics for instance. It 
permeates most science fields. We should consider heterophily as culturally-dissimilar others 
in the sense that it is opposed to homophily. 
 
2.7.5 Uncertainty in DIM 
...uncertainty is the degree to which a number of alternatives are associated 
with the occurrence of an event but the relative probability of the alternatives 
is unknown...Uncertainty is a barrier to diffusion, and its antidote is 
information. A certain degree of uncertainty always characterizes an 
                                                
167 Rogers et al, 2004 
168 Understood in this study to mean: disturbance or unsettling activity within a system. 
169 Rogers et al, 2004 
170 Verb in the former and noun in the latter “innovation”. 
171 Rogers et al, 1998 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
 
individual’s perceptions of a new idea, practice, or technology, which is one 
reason why the diffusion process occurs gradually172.  
There is a desire to work with predictable phenomena. When we are certain about 
consequences, we plan and commit resources with accuracy. So, the risk of loss is low and 
speculation minimal. Although certainty is desirable, in ideal and common social systems, it 
is impossible to guarantee. Uncertainty is the major reason why we should discuss early and 
late adopters. Early adopters, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, can absorb the risk. Late 
adopters, on the other hand, are concerned about placing early trust in an innovation.  
There was a discussion on uncertainty in Chapter 1 when we focused on Weick173. 
2.7.6 Diffusion of Innovations Model – An Illustration 
We discuss, below, a graphic illustration of DIM. Whether all innovations diffuse in this 
manner will is debatable. The model is a sensible representation of the adoption of 
innovation. The x-axis represents the rate of adoption. The y axis represents the increase or 
decrease in the number of adopters. There are interesting lessons from the graph. Firstly, the 
trend does not follow a straight line incremental style. It has five key points. Close to the “0” 
point (or where the axes meet), there is a very low rate of adoption. We may formulate the 
dominance of traditional systems174. Rogers et al. make the following points about the second 
point,  
A continuing increase in the number of adopters, or synapses, or processing 
elements, increases the energy being processed in the local system at the 
inflection175 point. Until that point of critical mass is reached on the S-curve, 
the rate of increase in the number of adopters per time unit is nearly linear. 
Complexity begins at a threshold of nonlinearity (So, Chen and Chen, 2005). 
In the diffusion system’s rate of adoption, this critical threshold has also been 
called the tipping point...176 
                                                
172 Rogers et al, 1998 
173 Weick, 1995 
174 Methods, mechanisms, ways and so on 
175 Reading Rogers et al. text, the preferred meaning of this term seems to be that referring to the notable 
change in a curve or direction 
176 Rogers et al, 2004. According to Gladwell, 2000, concepts on the “tipping point”, a tipping point is that 
stage when adoption of a phenomenon gets rapid. A contemporary term now used for this is “going viral”.  
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Non-linearity introduces complexity within diffusion. Up until the inflection point, the 
interaction amongst adopters is such that critical mass177 has not been achieved. Our 
questions seeking to understand the causes of the shift, in other words, the reason for trends 
or when it happens, in other words, what causes the shift to happen at the time that it does, 
require complex explanations. It is not easy to predict when the inflection happens. It seems 
that this is determined or influenced by several factors. Some likely reasons for are briefly 
explained below. 
The relationship between early adopters and the rest of the adopter population may affect the 
shape of the inflection on the graph, that is how early is peaks, how long it rides at the peak 
or fast it drops from the peak. The degree and kind of engagement, that is, the intimacy 
between the two groups is a factor that may affect adoption by members of the population 
who will adopt after the early adopters. Rogers et al seem to be pointing out this information 
when the use the term “system reactivity”.178  
The strategy of the initiator/s is another factor that may determine inflection. In the 
discussion on brand innovation, a point was made on the sensitivity to the customer. There 
must be an awareness by the initiator of the innovation, and in some cases, the early adopters, 
of the appropriate media and strategy to enable a quicker spread of the idea or innovation. 
The objective is to quickly realise the benefits of innovation relative to the degree of fatigue 
on finances invested on the innovation. Of course, this should be accompanied by sufficient 
information and dissemination of product information179 to ensure sustainable adoption. 
Lastly, and not requiring too much emphasis, the appeal of the idea is a significant 
determinant of the inflection graph. Alternatively, this refers to the appeal of the idea where 
options exist. Novel ideas must be offered for adoption after thorough studies on their 
usefulness and assessment of competition. The term “competition” is relative. In discussing 
innovation, the concern is on novel ideas. There is likely to be a tendency, however, for 
adopter populations to regard what is new as being like something they already know or use. 
But even radically innovative ideas are also subject to a worse fate: it may be hard to prove 
their benefit if civilisation has existed so long without them! 
The adopter unit is a system and there is interaction within the adopter unit (by their 
location/nature). Diffusion therefore represents the maturation of an idea. In other words, the 
                                                
177 That is, the ideal number of adopters to cause significant adoption by later adopters. 
178 Rogers et al, 2004 
179 As opposed to hype that creates a “bubble”. 
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actualisation of an initiator’s idea, his or her objective, is mass adoption of the idea. It is a 
fact that an idea’s adoption cannot start popular. It is made popular by targeting amenable or 
ready parts of the adopter unit. Whilst mass adoption is desired, some ideas die before they 
are significantly adopted180.Early adopters populate a zone at the first inflection point before 
the peak. The zone at the peak point is populated by a very heterogenous group. 
Our next focus is the “negative” deflective point. In the zone, interest to adopt in the zone is 
once again low. There is need to be curious about the causes of this death of diffusion at this 
point. It is certain that this is caused by a scaling of ideas, either a viable substitute or a 
merged one181. Ideas give way to better ones. Existing at the peak of an idea, where there is 
mass adoption, it is not easy to fathom what the next “big thing” is. It is not an irony that it 
would be easy to trace innovation backwards and very difficult to project its diffusion rate or 
even adoption.  
  
                                                
180 This phenomenon was dealt with in some detail in the discussion about Start-Up Life Cycle, Figure. 6. 
181 Defined as a merged substitute 
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Figure 6. An illustration of the DIM – Adoption Rate182 
 
Rogers et al. regard the target of innovation as adopter units. 
The adopter unit can be an individual or an organization (“individuals” 
hereafter, for simplicity). Each individual can be self-located in one of the five 
adopter categories (innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, 
and laggards) and the network provides connections through which an 
innovation spread...183 
Adopter units are like macro-scales. They are zones of interaction and may be composed of 
like-minded professionals. They are like communities of practice184. Within their ranks, it is 
                                                
182 The illustration is adopted from Mascola Insights, 2004. For this study, only the blue line in the graph is 
referred to. 
183 Rogers et al, 2004 
184 Communities of practice or CoPs are formally or informally organised groups of individuals sharing the 
same field or pursuit who interact regularly to know more about their common pursuit or how to improve on it 
(Wenger, 2009). The notion was first described by Lave and Wenger in 1991 (Eckert, 2006). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
possible to scale down, to the “micro-scale”185 and develop an interest in how they are 
organised into cliques and sub-groups. 
As individuals adopt an innovation, their microbehavior contributes to the 
macrosystem-level scale of behavior.186 
2.7.7 Variety 
Variety is a strong theme in the DIM. It refers to the existence of entities with different 
attributes in a system. In the case of the DIM, variety addresses the population of the adopter 
unit by individuals with distinct levels of acceptance or readiness to innovation. 
Variety is found in diffusion theory as heterophily, or degree to which 
individual communicators differ along traits pertinent to predisposition 
toward adoption.  
There is an irony about variety. It presents both an opportunity and a challenge. This depends 
on how high or low it is. 
A very high degree of heterophily will likely slow down diffusion, but some 
degree of heterophily among communicators is nonetheless necessary for an 
innovation to spread (that is, a source individual must know more, and is 
assumed to know more. about the innovation than a receiver one)187 
Variety should be regarded as a hallmark of complexity188 within the adopter unit and there 
are several ways of viewing this complexity.  
Firstly, all potential adopters bring in a significant amount of beliefs that help format the 
enhancement of the innovation. This is general referred to as critical review. Even two people 
with an optimistic or pessimistic assessment differ in what they perceive. Backgrounds 
determine how phenomena is judged.  
Secondly, where potential adopters are scarce, innovation is not open to mass adoption. It is a 
positive phenomenon that innovation is at the disposal of a heterogenous group. 
Further, filtration always occurs in the innovation process. This can be akin to testing and 
similar concepts. Resembling an uncontrolled experiment, innovations develop in a “social 
laboratory” which is really the spectrum of adopters.  
                                                
185 Rogers et al, 2004 
186 Rogers et al, 2004 
187 Rogers et al, 2004 
188 Indeed, in the Cynefin Model, which will be reviewed in Chapter 3, and in other literature, the ideal zone to 
locate manageable creativity is between complexity and order. That zone, the “edge of chaos”, fits the 
description merging “homophily” and “heterophily”. 
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2.7.8 Early Adopters’ Characteristics 
Rogers et al. have an interesting perspective on early adopters. 
...innovations diffuse more rapidly and successfully in highly reactant social 
networks, through relatively heterogeneous early adopters, who have the 
highest level of adaptability to change. They typically have high levels of 
disposable resources (high socioeconomic status), relatively more exposure to 
adopters from other social networks, and the inclination to try new ideas...189.  
They have an open-mind and tend to have good horizontal knowledge. Not quite inventors, 
they have a risk appetite that is greater than other potential adopters. Early adopters’ quality 
of having high levels of disposable resources is a special characteristic. Their possession of 
resources may be interpreted as their ability to suffer loss and rebound190. Leaders of 
organisation like Tesla and Google apparently exhibit this quality. It may be preferable to 
regard this alongside enablers dealt with in this chapter191.  
We can further analyse the anatomy of the group of potential adopters still referring to 
Rogers et al. 
An innovation comes into a system from outside, usually via an innovator or 
early adopter. Early adopters (“cosmopolites”) are typically sufficiently 
respected in their local communities (relative to innovators and outsiders) that 
others are willing to follow their lead. They, then, function as role models. An 
early adopter may also be an opinion leader, and/or well connected, so that 
s/he has above-average network-connectivity in the system (Rogers, 2003). 
Early adopters are therefore highly reactive—heterogeneous—and their 
behavior is conducive to reactivity in others, as they increase perturbation 
around themselves by virtue of their propensity to innovate. Once brought into 
the system, innovations diffuse through networks of social ties.192 
The application of the term cosmopolites193 to early adopters is revealing of their nature. 
Rogers et al. seem to imply their flexibility or versatility. Early adopters are open-minded 
people who are also keen adopters. This cosmopolitan characteristic of early adopters means 
                                                
189 Rogers et al, 2004 
190 The ability to suffer loss may be due to “last ditch” situation or for survival and not based on an abundance 
of resources only. 
191 In Section 2.3. 
192 Rogers et al, 2004 
193 Understood to mean individuals with the ability to function in a cross section of cultures. 
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they function within the edge of chaos194. This zone at the periphery of a system is highly 
active and it is like a border. It is an area of interface and a playground of early adopters. It is 
easy here to export properties of systems in the vicinity and market them to potential 
adopters. So, we could, in a way, regard early adopters as promiscuous and risk-takers. Early 
adopters are good importers.195 
There are generally two broad types of adopters: early adopters, whom we have located at the 
edge who are less risk averse, and there are late adopters. The low appetite by late adopters to 
quickly adopt ideas stems from their uncertainty about it. One of the strengths of early 
adopters, the cause of their desire to quickly adopt is that they have significant resources 
available to them. They are not worried about the valley of death196 or failure. One form of 
resource Rogers et al. point out is information. It is associated, as a remedy, with uncertainty, 
Uncertainty is a barrier to diffusion, and its antidote is information.  
Rogers et al. describe uncertainty as 
...the degree to which a number of alternatives are associated with the 
occurrence of an event but the relative probability of the alternatives is 
unknown 
In contrast, so we can conclude, it is possible that late adopters lack information by which to 
decide. Information, as pointed out, is not the only resource that may be wanting. Adopters 
may lack financial resources, they may live in an environment that is restrictive and may 
simply be too inundated. 
 
  
                                                
194 The edge of chaos is a virtual zone in systems conceptualized by Farmer (Keirsey, 2015) and popularized by 
Packard and Langton, a mathematician, where complexity is rife because it straddles order and chaos. It is 
generally regarded as presenting an immense potential for creativity. In Chapter 1, Snowden’s Cynefin model 
that exploits this notion. 
195 In fact, this is how neologisms are conjured and new language forms emanate.  Languages are formed and 
transitioned this way. Indeed, language formation and transitions are forms of innovation 
196 See a later discussion 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
Innovation was presented as an open concept embracing the input of both internal and 
external sources. Chesbrough and Dey’s ideas about both types of innovation as well as the 
enablers of it were presented. The discussion on enablers included that of objectives and 
strategy which emphasised the function of leadership in innovation. When we consider a 
culture of challenge, we are putting forth the idea that innovation is led. In addition, how 
strategy is framed determines the organisational resources that are provided for innovation 
and how much focus there is on this organisational facet. Culture therefore has boundary 
effects on creative behaviour and may curtail or promote innovation. The notion of open 
innovation by Chesbrough highlights that innovation is a systemic thing,197 where the 
organisation is a system contributing to innovation and in turn innovation is a system by itself 
sensitive to aspects inside and outside the organisation. 
The “Start-Up Life Cycle”198 presented an opportunity to analyse, in graphic form, the role of 
funding in innovation. We remarked on the relationship between this model and the DIM. 
The model emphasises value from the perception consumers or late adopters and highlights 
that funding is a critical aspect in innovation. We remarked earlier on the link between 
strategy and funding. 
Holland’s theory illustrates that in the scheme of innovation, models and metaphors are key 
to the creative processes. Drawing from what is known or old, using these as blocks, 
innovations and novelty is become possible. The process, it can be concluded from the 
discussion on Holland, is not linear. 
Weick’s social creation explains why there is a rise in ambiguity and uncertainty. Uncertainty 
must not be interpreted as vanity. It still illustrates the complexity about social creation. At 
every state, the social system presents forms that are an improvement from preceding states. 
It depicts social inventions as the results of both individual and collective input even within 
the existent of tension. 
The DIM was useful in analysing processes that occur during the adoption of innovations. 
We took interest in the fundamentals around early adopters who are characteristically 
cosmopolitan amongst other interesting characteristics; heterogeneity, which is a property 
that characterises most social systems and the uncertain late adopters. Like Dey and 
                                                
197 Systems view is the perception that an entity functions as a relationship of several systems with it. A 
systems view helps in emphasizing complexity.  
198 (ECE/CECI/7) United Nations, 2009  
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Chesbrough’s concepts, the DIM serves to illustrate complexity in innovation. It especially 
focuses on the perpetuation of innovation rather than creativity. The low appetite by late 
adopters to quickly adopt ideas stems from their uncertainty.  
The critical lessons from this chapter have been that: 
1. Innovation is about improvement of an entity’s delivery of business to its 
customers. The improvement that innovation delivers to customers equates to 
value for the business. 
2. Innovation is complex in that it is determined by a multitude of factors named 
enablers. These have an influence on its success. Enablers range from culture to 
business processes and finance. The influence of finance to innovation was 
explained using the “Start-Up Life Cycle”199. 
3. Social factors have a role in innovation and innovation must ideally be exposed 
to the influence of a business’ stakeholders. Weick and Chesbrough’s insights, 
alongside those of Holland, emphasises the “soft” dimension of innovation. 
Innovation should not take place isolated from social influences. 
4. As an extension of the observation about social factors in innovation, it is 
worthwhile to consider the reception and assimilation of customers, identified 
as “adopters” by Rogers et al, in the innovation process. They can cause success 
or failure of innovation regardless of whether it is well financed or has the 
potential to improve their lives or add value. There must be a healthy variety of 
those who are willing to quickly adopt novel ideas and those who are slow at 
adopting them. The insights from Weick, Chesbrough, Holland and Rogers et 
al recognise heterogeneity in innovation. 
  
                                                
199 (ECE/CECI/7) United Nations, 2009  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 
 
Chapter 3 
Emergence as a Concept – 
Emmeche et al 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will describe and analyse a classic paper on emergence by Emmeche et al.200 
The three authors, Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt come from diverse fields. Emmeche 
describes himself as a theoretical biologist and has a special interest in artificial life which 
involves simulations and complexity notions.  
The two other authors who collaborated also have fascinating profiles. In the section 
explaining their choice of comparative analysis, the authors comment about their article and 
say 
(The) combination of historical discussion, conceptual analysis and 
argumentation compatible with science is our explicit - and pluralistic - 
choice in this article. It not only synthesizes the three authors' different 
backgrounds (philosophy, biology, linguistics, literary criticism, psychology), 
it also proves to be a fruitful way of dealing with a concept of this kind.201 
The terms pluralistic and synthesis have a great bearing in the formation of this thesis202. On 
occasions synonyms of these terms, “multiple”, “interdisciplinary” and “combination”, are 
explored as critical notions in both emergence and innovation. These latter three terms bring 
out almost the same notions as do “pluralistic” and “synthesizes”. Køppe is a 
Danish psychologist and philosopher of science. He is a professor of psychology at the 
University of Copenhagen. Stjernfelt is a Professor of Philosophy of Science, History of 
Ideas and Semiotics at the Department of Arts and Cultural Studies. This inter-disciplinary 
and pluralistic nature of their project is a theme running in this thesis.  
This chapter has the role of explaining emergence from the perspective of Emmeche et al. It 
will describe how they explain emergence by way of an ontology of levels. 
                                                
200 Emmeche et al, 1997,  
201 Emmeche et al, 1997 
202 That is on exploring emergence in innovation and using emergence as an explanation of emergence. 
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...sciences clearly indicate(s) that a philosophical concept of emergence as 
something exceptional and in principle unexplainable by science always runs 
the risk of being overridden by history in the development of science.203 
In other words, we must push for a scientific explanation of emergence. If we maintain 
emergence as a lofty idea that is beyond explanation, we may end up with it being considered 
as a worthless idea that has no use or function in current philosophical thought. In that sense, 
it may only be remembered later as a concept that had little consequence in academic matters. 
This then leads to a conclusion that Emmeche et al. are working, in their thesis, to say 
emergence is explainable and has function in contemporary subjects. Their thesis finds a solid 
foundation in Lloyd Morgan’s treatment of emergence204 and but incorporate a dimension of 
levels to it. A strong emphasis is placed on emergence’s roots in vitalism205 having 
“vitalistic” roots and how it was devitalised206 
...any non-reductionist theorist of levels must imply some version of the 
concept of emergence 
Emergence is initially distinguished by two characteristics. The first, is that it is “non-
reductionist”. It assumes a concept that is on a spectrum in variation to reductionist notions. 
The ensuing analysis identifies it with complexity. The second characteristic, enables 
theoretical descriptions that identify levels to qualify as explaining versions of emergence. 
The question may be to ask whether emergence is a model, notion207, theory or framework? 
Emmeche et al. have regarded it as each of these in various sections of their study.  First, they 
regard it as a notion that “if there is not any principal difference between the "jump" (as the 
popular notion of emergence is often named).”208 and in several other instances as a concept, 
for instance: “In a broader historical view it is a fact, that the concept of emergence does have 
a central position inside these new domains.”209  
                                                
203 Emmeche et al, 1997 
204 Morgan, 1921. Morgan regards “emergence” as “emergent evolution”. 
205 A philosophical foundation, the basis of some theories that supported the belief that life emanates from an 
unexplainable vital or supernatural force. 
206 Deprived of an immaterial causal agent or teleology OR became creation of new properties regardless of the 
substance involved 
207 This term’s connotation is not very divorced from “concept”. It is also synonymous with “idea” 
208 Emmeche et al, 1997  
209 Emmeche et al, 1997 
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Of interest to this study, is a submission by Emmeche et al. below that says, 
If ontologically interpreted then, emergence will characterize the one and only 
'creative force' in the whole universe, and if epistemologically interpreted, it 
will be a name designating a large scope of various and perhaps very different 
types of processes. 
Considering the objective of this study, it is necessary to understand their thesis and establish  
the above claim’s validity on innovation processes. It is a good starting point to understand  
their definition of emergence.  
 
3.2 What is emergence? 
 
In their article, there are instances where Emmeche et al. define emergence. Generally, for 
them it is “the denomination of something new which could not be predicted from elements 
constituting the preceding condition.”210 In this definition, the key phrases are “denomination 
of something new” and “could not be predicted”. Both concepts of “new” and predictability 
have sections devoted to the later. In the philosophy of “new” we should, each time, wonder 
about whether what is manifest was expected and variant to expectation. This notion appeals 
to our desire for control and to preparedness. As they put it, “emergence is exactly that 
reasonable aspect of vitalism which is worth to maintain.”211 
In this claim, the authors use the “compare and contrast” tool to illustrate what emergence is 
by stating that it is deducible from vitalism. The balance of the vitalism theory is not valid in 
contemporary theory. In other words, emergence is described as having emanated from 
vitalism. To understand emergence, we should trace its vitalism roots. The authors then 
narrate tenets of vitalism to validate their claim that “emergence is first of all defined as "the 
creation of new properties.”212 Their article relies heavily on a definition by Morgan of 
emergence as "creation of new properties”. The definition phrase "creation of new properties” 
is explored and broken down in terms of three key words: “creation”, “new” and “properties”. 
In the thesis, it is explained that the critical omission in Morgan’s explanation of emergence 
is the notion of supervenience and levels. 
                                                
210 Emmeche et al, 1997  
211 Emmeche et al, 1997  
212 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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Emergence is among other things the concept which relates levels to each 
other - or to be more precise, the concept which denotes the very passage 
between them.213 
In keeping with the assertion by Emmeche et al. that Morgan’s explanation omits a key 
notion in emergence, supervenience, the authors add a definition using that missing 
dimension. Emergence must also be described as a notion that acknowledges the function of 
levels in complex phenomena. The key phrases in this description of emergence would 
therefore be “relates levels to each other” and “passage between them”. This implies both 
relatedness and dynamism. 
...emergence is at stake at the borders between the large sciences: where the 
explanatory power of one science must give in, another must take over at the 
level of the hitherto unexplainable - emergent - property. But it is not possible 
to restrict emergence to these borders.214 
This description of emergence is rooted in the philosophy of explanation. Subtly also, and 
clear in the thesis, it also implies the existence of levels and relationships. In a sense, 
therefore, it is an emphasis of the description we dealt with immediately above since it 
recognises the existence of more than one dimension and progression – what we called 
dynamism – in the phrase “must take over”. 
In saying “emergence is used as the description of the creation of primary levels, creation of 
sublevels, and creation of single entities”215 Emmeche et al highlight and emphasise, by the 
force of their repetition, the idea that emergence is concerned with creation. In all three cases, 
“creation” is a common process. This definition appeals therefore to our understanding of 
levels in emergence more than it does to how these levels are related.  
The ““jump" (as the popular notion of emergence is often named)”216  used by Emmeche et al 
to signify the differentiation from level to level is a deceiving term. As explained in a 
discussion on supervenience later, the differentiation from level to level is a relationship and 
coexistence. “(J)ump” cannot be taken at its value and made to imply a sudden movement or 
quick transition. More precise, is their description that “emergence is not an omnipresent 
creative force, but simply the fact that some of these virtual processes possess new 
                                                
213 Emmeche et al, 1997  
214 Emmeche et al, 1997  
215 Emmeche et al, 1997  
216 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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properties.”217 It offers emergence as being outside mysticism but still describing “processes” 
within the spectrum of the “virtual”. 
The above description here is delineating. The attempt here seems to be to present, in true 
detachment from supernatural and immaterial vitalistic notions, emergence as being within 
the grasp of scientific explanation. 
In the statement “(t)his latter process of a level constituting emergence is in general the 
process unfolding when the potentialities in the entity develop in relation to other entities”218 
There is an acknowledgment, in this description, of emergence’s complexity nature. Also, not 
to be ignored is the notion of “potentialit(y)”. This implies indeterminability and the 
difficulty of knowing outcomes related to the entity. Therefore Emmeche et al. must point out 
that “emergence is not necessarily unexplainable,”219 and that “emergence is not an 
indeterministic process.”220 The concept of emergence “is opposed to those of reductionism, 
determinism and/or mechanistic materialism.”221 A point is made here to separate emergence 
from mechanistic materialism and reductionism.  
There is an interesting dimension to this discovery of so many descriptions of emergence by 
Emmeche et al. They state that it is their preference to offer this multiplicity of views about 
this subject. It is ideal to offer different versions of description when dealing with a 
“difficult” topic as it is. We should also allow the view that “emergence is used as the 
description of the creation of primary levels, creation of sublevels, and creation of single 
entities.”222 
Emergence is also an idea and a process. 
The idea of emergence may refer to two kinds of processes: first, processes 
that we cannot explain at present, but which are not in principle 
unexplainable, and second, processes that in some use of the word are in 
principle unexplainable.223  
                                                
217 Emmeche et al, 1997  
218 Emmeche et al, 1997  
219 Emmeche et al, 1997  
220 Emmeche et al, 1997  
221 Emmeche et al, 1997  
222 Emmeche et al, 1997  
223 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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There are two forms of processes it has been applied to in the above conceptualisation by 
Emmeche et al. The first can be understood to be phenomena that cannot be clarified using 
our current knowledge. Their determinants can be identified but it is difficult to reasonably 
spell out the interactions that finally give rise to a phenomenon which presents. The second 
form, lies outside our ability even to define the determinants. Emmeche et al. therefore 
confidently conclude that “emergence is a genuine phenomenon”224. The announcement here 
is almost like a conclusion225. The employment of the word genuine is curious. We make a 
point that the thesis appears to contain a series of rebuttals. It is work designed to strengthen 
the emergence argument. In other words, the claim is that emergence is an authentic scientific 
notion worthy of study, focus and application for contemporary phenomena.  
 
3.3 Creativity 
 
Creation was a strong theme in the explanation of emergence in Section 3.2. A focus on 
“creation” and the noun “creativity” seems to be one of the key exercises in understanding 
Emmeche et al’s perspective on emergence. 
By saying that “if we restrict creation to its possible scientific meaning - and not its religious 
- there will always exist some conditions for the creation of a new property”226, Emmeche et 
al. seem to be making a commitment of emergence to the scientific and not the supernatural. 
They also add that new properties are being created “regardless of the substance involved”.227 
But what is “substance”? We may consider substance not only in the tangible sense but in the 
conceptual sense as well – philosophical substance. The limits of semantics are obvious here 
and we can be satisfied by this inference if we can follow Emmeche et al. depiction that “it is 
beyond the wit of man to number the instances of emergence”228, and that, “there will always 
exist some conditions for the creation of new properties”229. So, if emergence is the creation 
of new properties, and opportunities for emergence are countless, with new properties are 
being created regardless of the substance involved, and emergence will characterize the one 
                                                
224 Emmeche et al, 1997  
225 This statement is made after several deductions and is done near the end of the thesis. 
226 Emmeche et al, 1997  
227 Emmeche et al, 1997 
228 Emmeche et al, 1997  
229 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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and only “creative force” in the whole universe, we may conclude a wide, material and 
immaterial application of the term “substance”. 
Firstly, “create” is a verb. The strict application of the term in emergence however restricts 
connotations of getting ingredients or resources together and “making” as in baking or 
building a house. Such a conceptualisation would be reductionist and mechanical and of little 
interest in complexity studies. The etymology of the word “create” provides some insight into 
the application of “creation” by Emmeche et al. The etymology of the word is connected to 
the Latin word “creāre”. We must separate the one connotation of the word linked to divine 
creation which is almost like saying “to make out of nothing230. The closer connotation is “to 
grow”.231A Greek equivalent of it is “κόρη” referring to a child and meaning “the ones that 
are growing = kids.”232 From an etymological background, therefore “create” refers to 
phenomena that have some self-organisation and complexity as of a biological or astrological 
nature.   
The inclination in Emmeche et al’s use of the term “creation”233, and they explicitly exclude 
the religious connotation, is associated with the following terms that they employ 
1. constituted: as in, for instance, “when the level is constituted”234. Constitution implies the 
coming together of many constituents or entities. There is a notion, in the term “constitution” 
of the formation of a whole from many entities. 
2. explanation: as in, for instance “historical explanation…structural explanation”235.  
3. inclusive: as in, for instance, “Levels are inclusive…”236 
4. supervenience: we deal with “supervenience” 237 in section 3.7. 
5. regularity: as in “regularity should rather be interpreted as the “formal cause””238 
 
 
 
                                                
230 Jacquet, 2013 
231 Jacquet, 2013 
232 Jacquet, 2013 
233 Emmeche et al, 1997  
234 Emmeche et al, 1997  
235 Emmeche et al, 1997  
236 Emmeche et al, 1997  
237 Emmeche et al, 1997 
238 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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3.4 Determinism and Predictability 
 
A deeper understanding of the notion of creation as a term in emergence should require a 
contrasting of two commonly confused ideas: that of determinism and predictability. It is 
critical in this thesis to explore determinism and predictability in depth as well as the 
complexity insight that determinism does not imply predictability. It is not a conflict. To 
determine is not to predict. Determinism involves working out the factors that led or lead to a 
state or states. It does not mean the ability to know, beforehand, the true nature or quality of 
the state or states. The latter is the claim in prediction and a notion common in reductionist 
reasoning or in mechanistic phenomena.  
Elsewhere Baas and Emmeche article, whilst describing emergence as a notion say that in 
“the study of complex systems, one often sees that a collection of interacting systems shows 
collective behaviour”239. We may say that emergence has some parallels with holism. An 
emergent entity has holistic behaviour. That collective behaviour has diametrical 
implications on prediction and determinism for the entity: 
…the concept of emergence - formulated as the idea that there are properties 
at a certain level of organization which cannot be predicted from the 
properties found at lower levels. We argue that even if determinism prevails, 
this does not entail predictability.240 
This is because we do not know all parameters and factors at play in creation, the same 
(determinants) act differently at separate times. Determinism is therefore a situational 
phenomenon. Determinism means we can identify layers but cannot accurately guess the 
consequence of their interaction. We are always sure that emergence will play out. 
Emergent phenomena are unpredictable and unexplainable, it seems. They are 
unpredictable until the moment when they are described....241 
Also, 
Today it is evident that a lot of systems exist which on the one hand are 
described adequately as being strictly deterministic but on the other hand 
remain unpredictable.242  
                                                
239 Baas and Emmeche, 1997 
240 Emmeche et al, 1997  
241 Emmeche et al, 1997  
242 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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The foregoing, to a reductionist, would seem like an irony. Emergence also has application in 
hard sciences. 
Emmeche et al quip, “A lot of processes in physics - and hence also in the many levels and 
sublevels above physics - are in this way unpredictable even if they still are deterministic”243. 
From this perspective, a mechanical determinism claim that we can determine the outcomes 
as in making predictions of how phenomena can play out each time is disputable. Emmeche 
et al. provide a perfect illustration when they give the description below. 
In principle, given certain boundary conditions, the behaviour and 
macrophysical properties (such as heat, pressure, volume and temperature) of 
a gas is only determined by the place and momentum (and form) of every 
single molecule within it - parameters which we could in principle know - and 
is thus governed by mechanical laws which are at our disposal. Nevertheless, 
this knowledge is for practical reasons impossible to obtain, and one has to 
resort to consider the statistical behaviour of the constituent particles in order 
to derive the equations of state (of these properties) of the gas, i.e., the 
phenomena at the macro level.244  
Statistical information on phenomena has its uses but it fails at producing enough deductive 
information us to predict accurately. Small variations on constituent parts can have 
significant consequences on states or creation. This characteristic is typical of complex 
phenomena. 
Further, our operation at a certain level mostly renders us oblivious of the activity at other 
levels. It is a matter of perspective245. Our preoccupation is on our current paradigm or 
immediate environment. And Emmeche aptly sums it up this way, 
If you only existed at the microphysical level, you would never be able to 
identify the macrophysical phenomena. And this is one of the large facts in 
favour of emergence in contrast to the hard reductionists and eliminativists: 
the fact that it is impossible in these cases to interpret a lower level 
explanation without using some higher-level concepts to identify what is going 
on.246 
                                                
243 Emmeche et al, 1997  
244 Emmeche et al, 1997 p. 14  
245 To quote Morgan, 1997 p. 217, “way of seeing become ways of not seeing.” 
246 Emmeche et al, 1997 p. 15  
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That inability to adequately understand the higher level from a lower level perspective does 
not, however, imply a lack of impact lower level operations on the higher. It is just 
ignorance. It is not a separation. An unawareness of macro-physical phenomena does not 
imply non- influence of the lower level on the higher. On the contrary, the contribution of 
microphysical phenomena on the macro-physical is a phenomenon that is significantly 
characteristic of complex phenomena. These individual units on the micro scale may not be 
linked by any common characteristic but nevertheless comprise parts of a system. 
In Emmeche’ et al’s view, it is still important to understand the macro-level, to pick the 
pattern. If we start at the micro-level, we may not get the picture. In other words, explanation 
is ideally top-down, 
...but any explanation of a recognized higher-level phenomenon must start 
with the higher-level phenomena to identify what to investigate thereby using 
some identification of the process or object. ... This very identification can 
never be totally discarded in a lower-level explanation, because in the 
ultimate through-and-through lower-level explanation one might never know 
which higher-level phenomenon it was an explanation of.  
We identify the micro-level based on the macro-level it helps us identify 
deterministic processes.247 
 
3.5 The Function of Information  
 
The function and behaviour of information in complexity has an irony. In linear and 
mechanical reasoning, availability of information brings an assumption that one knows 
enough about a system to make deductions or even predictions about it. In other words, 
information can provide an idea of determinants and consequences to a system. In focusing 
on the primary level, within complexity and emergence however, the foregoing, by Emmeche 
et al’s explanation, is not the case. There is still a difficulty in foreseeing the result based on 
the information at hand: 
The drawback in the idea of "primary" emergence is that it is by no means 
evident that the emergent process itself contains information about how "big" 
the resultant class of new objects is going to be.248 
                                                
247 Emmeche et al, 1997 p. 15 
248 Emmeche et al, 1997 p. 7  
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This is a contrast to traditional Newtonian, mechanistic or linear processes’ explanation. This 
incapability to predict system behaviour increases with the amount of information and 
consequently spells uncertainty. 
In systems considered perfectly deterministic...an unpredictability is at issue 
which is not tied to the observing subject's lack of power to obtain information 
about the single elements of the system. No matter how much information 
obtained, the behaviour of the system will still be unpredictable after a certain 
lapse of time - the uncertainty of the information about the system will grow 
exponentially in relation to the uncertainty on the initial conditions... 
Even the explanation of DNA information acting to determine life form has limitations. The 
requirement is to consider factors other than its chemistry.  
Even though DNA is a macromolecule, its role as carrier of information is not 
entailed merely by its chemical constitution. It follows that life is irreducible 
to chemistry... It would be not only impossible in relation to your actual 
knowledge249, but in principle impossible (regardless of your knowledge) for 
computational reasons: to determine which possible chemical combinations 
possess life-like properties, 
Emmeche et al. in asserting the irreducibility of life250 here demonstrate another instance of 
emergence and levels, a theme in emergence we dealt with earlier. Although life, in this case 
is considered to have emerged from chemistry, it is impossible to reduce it to chemistry and 
work out any scenarios even with the best knowledge about the chemical constitution in the 
DNA of a life form. 
 
3.6 Levels and their Relationship 
 
The discussion above on some of the key parameters on emergence, namely creation, 
predictability, determination and function of information have laid some foundation to enable 
an understanding of emergence in Emmeche et al’s perspective. This section and the next 
will focus on two critical descriptions of levels and supervenience. 
Emmeche et al. handle levels in their thesis and distinguish that this problem was not 
addressed by Morgan251. Therefore, the discussion on levels is thematic in Emmeche et al’s 
                                                
249 The inference here is not knowledge as in “capacity to act”, in proper definition, but information known. 
250 That is, to chemistry. The insights here have a significant basis on Polanyi’s work. Goldstein, 2012. 
251 Who addressed “emergence” as “emergent evolution” 
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conceptualisation of emergence and was closed a previous section when “micro-level” and 
“macro-level” distinctions were quoted. 
The discussion of levels may be related to that evolution. This is hinted in the descriptions of 
evolution in which the emphasis is on the word “development”252. This means that Also, 
complex phenomena evolve from simple phenomena over time. Complexity is derived from 
the simple and then there is remarkable modification. 
The higher levels are as ontologically pre-eminent253 as the lower ones, even 
if being presupposed by them, that is, they are defined by properties by special 
cases of the lower levels. In this respect, levels are ontologically parallel, but 
non-parallel in so far as they coexist. 
The higher levels are as ontologically pre-eminent as the lower ones…254  
The levels are equally ranked. We cannot talk about the higher level without dealing with its 
relationship with the lower.  
The specified levels are inclusive in the sense that a level which has evolved at 
the basis of another is not able to change the laws of the lower level.255  
...levels are ontologically parallel, but non-parallel in so far as they coexist.256 
In other words, levels fit a unique epistemic description even though they are related and 
interdependent. Change and influence is, however, one directional. We have seen, above, that 
this should not be interpreted to mean predictability. 
Emmeche et al. provide an example of this using physics, as a subject, and its relationship 
with other subjects. A further point, seen in the quote below, is that, even though in is not 
recognisable, properties of the upper level are already existent in the lower level. Operating at 
the lower level, one may not realise the existence of these.  
The further consequence for physics is that it ceases to be identified with the 
science bearing this name to-day: the so-called "physical" description of a 
particle is not exhaustive, because a really exhaustive description would 
                                                
252 Emmeche et al, 1997  
253 Pre-eminent means the exceeding of others in quality or rank; of outstanding excellence, extremely notable, 
or important. 
254 Emmeche et al, 1997  
255 Emmeche et al, 1997  
256 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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contain a description of the possible combinations of the particle with other 
particles to larger entities, for instance biological, psychological, social ones.  
In other words, higher level entities cannot be described without accommodating descriptions 
of lower level entities. To be comprehensive in describing an entity, one must include a 
description of what makes it. 
As Fink states: "A certain knowledge can be the condition for another 
knowledge, but it is not because the first knowledge concern a deeper, and the 
second a more superficial level in nature" (Fink 1990 p. 37). Whilst this point 
of view entails the seemingly reductionist consequence that biology is part of 
physics, it consequentially also must make room for the opposite idea: what 
we used to call physics is already biology, even if it is biology in a rather 
restricted sense.257 
In illustration, physics, therefore, is not self-constituted258 but carries within it descriptions 
from other subjects. It must, when described, contain elements of other subjects in the 
description. So then, one “knowledge” has become a condition for another259. There is no 
inferiority but relationships. There is supervenience and no reductionism. This is because, in 
reductionism, we can always operate forwards taking apart elements of a phenomenon and 
still work backwards to reconstruct without loss of function, material or form. There is to be a 
method that sets the standard on how we can distinguish lower levels from higher ones. 
The concept of levels is for instance implied in the preceding distinction 
between global and local processes. When we say that physical processes are 
global and biological processes are local, the implication is that physical laws 
are identical all over the universe - the physical level is the most basic level, 
from which all other levels arise.260  
and 
Now primary levels will be the levels whose entities are central to a large 
population of higher levels.261  
                                                
257 Emmeche et al, 1997  
258 Colloquially, it is not made of itself! 
259 Emmeche et al, 1997  
260 Emmeche et al, 1997  
261 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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This is not to say, of course, that a level remains lower or higher or lower in all regards. 
When it determines another, it qualifies as the lower and if it is determined it is a higher level. 
This is insightful to deal with Emmeche et al. postulation of levels. It seems as key to 
understanding their thesis. They cite it as a hypothesis that is “stimulating”.  
In our discussion of levels, we find it a realistic and stimulating working 
hypothesis to concentrate on four primary levels - the physical, the biological, 
the psychological and sociological.262 
Emmeche et al’s postulation of levels emergence recognises a four-primary-level ontology, 
being, physics, biology, psychology and sociology. In their narrative, we deduce that a level 
of emergence above another is composed by the one below it. Interestingly the entity that is 
below another level already bears elements of the upper level. We find this to be an irony of 
relationships263. There is therefore a scaling in the levels and entities. There is difficulty in 
determining a clear line separating two levels. There is, it appears, a seamless boundary. 
 
3.7 Supervenience as Relatedness 
 
Dealing with supervenience in the concept of emergence serves to emphasise, amongst other 
purposes that emergence is not nor does not imply direct / efficient causation264. Emergence, 
it seems, is a case of tracing preconditions and relationships of phenomena. 
The discussion on supervenience was anticipated in our discussion on levels in the discussion 
of the relatedness of levels. 
Emergence speaks of the assumption of qualitative characteristics by quantitative entities. 
Each time we regard emergence, we must consider at least two levels, one graduating from 
another. This must not be understood to mean that they exist separated by time as Emmeche 
et al. caution when they say we must “avoid parallelistic interpretation”265 and “when the 
level is constituted it does not exist in parallel. Levels are inclusive in that respect”266. There 
is an association. One, the lower, has been transcended by the other whilst they co-exist in a 
dimension of relatedness. So, emergence “is among other things the concept which relates 
                                                
262 Emmeche et al, 1997  
263 Dealt with in section 3.7 as “supervenience”. 
264 An explanation of the elements, factors or determinations of a phenomenon.  
265 Emmeche et al, 1997  
266 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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levels to each other - or to be more precise, the concept which denotes the very passage 
between them”267. So supervenience is about relationships and extends to descriptions of how 
levels proceed from one to the other. Emmeche et al268 describe this relationship as “the 
lower level has no sole responsibility in causing the higher.”269 
Supervenience separates emergent phenomena from the reductionist and mechanical notion 
of efficient causation. This is dispelled since it is not correct to state a single aspect as being 
the cause of another.  
Emmeche et al’s illustration is by way of using the relationship between sciences and saying 
that, 
Borders between sciences must never be maintained rigoristically: we can 
never know if a given border can or cannot be transgressed by some empirical 
or theoretical result.270 
The caution is not to restrict the influence of one science on the other. It is a possibility that a 
connection or relationship exists. Which leads to Emmeche et al saying,  
Higher levels are ontologically pre-eminent at the lower ones, even if being 
presupposed by them, that is, they are defined by properties by special cases 
of the lower levels... levels are ontologically parallel, but non parallel in so 
far as they exist.271 
There is stress on the higher levels which must not, whilst being in the foreground, 
overshadow the fact that they exist because of the existence of the lower levels. The lower 
level entities determine the higher. 
Emmeche et al then observes that: 
 
Regardless of whether the unity or disunity of science is sought almost all 
agree that someone or other version of a supervenience relation between 
higher- and lower-level entities exists... Thus, those who adhere to disunity, 
                                                
267 Emmeche et al, 1997  
268 Emmeche et al, 1997 
269 Emmeche et al, 1997 
270 Emmeche et al, 1997  
271 Emmeche et al, 1997   
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nevertheless, recognise that the different levels of reality are necessarily, 
connected272. 
Emmeche et al seem to be suggesting that even if there is no objective to relate sciences and a 
ritual to treat them as separate, it is possible to find relationships. They seem to suggest that 
relationship even for cases where phenomena operate in separation as may be perceived from 
a mechanical perspective. 
Supervenience, therefore, is the relatedness of properties of the lower and upper levels. And 
Emmeche et al. state this about lower and upper levels 
They are created in interaction and parallel with each other, and does (sic) 
not therefore evolve in a serial manner, as the biological in relation to the 
physical.273 
In describing levels, an irony manifests about their relationship. First there is interaction 
during their creation. This may imply some determinism of one on the other. There is 
interdependence at creation. Secondly, there is parallelism about the levels. They exist 
distinctly.  
The irony is therefore in the interaction and parallelism. In complexity, this phenomenon 
does not seem to be rare. Entities may relate but still exist in autonomy but simultaneously 
without any implication of efficient causation 
...if the higher level consists of units of the lower level, then they exist 
simultaneously. 
But this indicates that the relation of supervenience is not a case of efficient 
causation. The type of cause making the higher level exist is a special 
arrangement of the units. 274 
The matter of efficient causation as a theme is overwhelmed by the explanation of 
supervenience in complex systems. This weakens the argument for linear notions that view 
causation as proceeding logically from a level to another. Emmeche et al’s assertion here is a 
huge rebuttal to mechanistic causation. 
That levels are inclusive means that a higher level does not violate lower level 
laws, that the higher level is materially related to the lower one, and that this 
                                                
272 Le Boutillier, 2003 
273 Emmeche et al, 1997 
274 Emmeche et al, 1997 
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does not imply that the organizing principle of the higher level can be deduced 
from lower level laws.275  
Supervenience is a matter of relationship not causation, since “there is no natural distinction 
between cause and effect. The two are parts of one and the same process.”276 There is clear 
irony in this. Seamlessness is a feature in how one can describe matters of cause and effect.  
But all relevant parameters in the regularity of a process of cause is equally 
determinant for its outcome - and the upper level is in this respect as much 
part of the regularity as is the lower one.277  
Emmeche et al’s philosophy for modelling levels is made clear in the foregoing that also lays 
emphasis on relationships, 
Level constitution organizes primary entities into a new structure of 
relations… Now primary levels will be the levels whose entities are central to 
a large population of higher levels. 278  
Their levels ontology, discussed above279, models this perfectly. Physics, as a primary level, 
has entities instrumental in the development of biology and so forth. 
 
3.8 Borders in Emergence 
 
It is may be sensible to succeed the description of supervenience with a discussion on 
borders. At face value, and having dealt with supervenience, it may seem contradictory for 
Emmeche et al to employ the term “borders” to in the same thesis. The theme therefore 
deserves some exposition in how it is brought into their Emmeche et al’s theory.  
Emmeche et al say that “emergence is at stake at the borders between the large sciences.”280 
Their view is to doubt any argument that stresses the existence of clear boundaries within 
complex phenomena. It is assumed here that this refers to a separation between two levels of 
reality: “rigoristically: we can never know if a given border can or cannot be transgressed by 
                                                
275 Emmeche et al, 1997  
276 That is, direct causation. 
277 Emmeche et al, 1997  
278 Emmeche et al, 1997  
279 See section on “levels above". 
280 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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some empirical or theoretical result”281. A fitting illustration they provide is that of levels in 
biology: 
It seems intuitively correct to talk about for instance biology as one coherent 
field while at the other hand this field seems to be internally subdivided into a 
lot of levels also defined by emergence.282  
And further, 
Differences may be objective - it is no subjectivist or purely epistemological 
point of view - but they are always relative to other relations of similarities 
between the objects compared283.  
The absence of seamlessness may therefore be confined to mechanical notions and not 
complex ones. There will always be a factor relating phenomena at distinct levels. So, “the 
levels exist ontologically (and materialistically/realistically), but we might never be able to 
say where exactly the borders are”284. Because of this view, the notion of borders in 
emergence is sensibly an extension of the one on supervenience. 
A clarification of levels and supervenience and borders will be succeeded with that of the 
gestalt and pattern making in Section 3.9.  
 
3.9 The Gestalt and Pattern Making 
 
The gestalt view, recalled by Emmeche et al in their text, exposes a micro-macro relationship 
between levels of emergence. It is almost like a mosaic and expressed as “the higher-level 
manifests itself as a pattern or as a special arrangement of entities of the lower”285. The 
entities of the lower level work to compose the full picture of the higher level. The phrase 
“special arrangement” must be qualified. The adjective “special”, addresses a respect of 
factors obeyed by the lower entities. So, it is not a “disorderly” process. It is governed by 
rules that order the system. In explaining this, we may say that if disorder manifests, it is a 
perception of an observer who cannot see or even foresee any outcomes in the process.  
In “arrangement’, we can deduce that Emmeche et al. are saying that parts are set up in a 
format. The emphasis is on “pattern’. Patterns give shape, form and structure to the whole. 
                                                
281 Emmeche et al, 1997  
282 Emmeche et al, 1997  
283 Emmeche et al, 1997  
284 Emmeche et al, 1997   
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The full picture at the higher level does not readily manifest the contribution of each 
constituent. 
One way of viewing a gestalt within emergence is to regard it as a paradigm. It is a view of 
the whole. 
If you imagine yourself existing on the lower level you would hence not be 
able to realize or grasp the pattern which is only possible to conceive of at a 
higher level.  
Many - if not all - emergent phenomena shares this gestalt property of being a 
pattern in time and space of elements of the lower level.286  
The Gestalt is a parallel view of a complete, total whole on the upper and complete, total 
whole on the lower. It is however not all gestalts that show emergence. Reproducibility 
appears to form part of the criteria.  
Still, on the other hand, pattern-making itself seems not to be enough to fulfil 
the requirements of emergence (many patterns, even if objectively existing and 
discernible by for instance neural networks - for instance ornaments - can be 
constructed which are not evident examples of emergence); emergence seems 
to require patterns whose stability and reproducibility over time is assured by 
self-organization.287 
 
3.10 Intersubjectivity / Objectivity: The Shaping of Reality 
 
An important theme Emmeche et al. touch on, in a discussion of kinds of levels, is that of 
“intersubjectivity”288. Intersubjectivity may address the human dimension of supervenience 
since it appears to explain the relationships and how they shape reality. “Shape” has 
synonymy with “pattern”. The Gestalt view, which was addressed in the section before has a 
strong focus on patterns. 
In a social system, we identify the role of the self, the self’s perception and ideology as it 
works alongside others. Individuals communicate their aspirations and views to others, who 
also have their own aspirations and views.  
                                                
286 Emmeche et al, 1997  
287 Emmeche et al, 1997   
288 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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[M]an's specific defining feature seem to be self-consciousness, intimately 
related to language acquisition, to the possibility to transcend the local 
situation both spatially and temporally, and again to intersubjectivity.289 
We see that what people think not only has consequences to their reality but to their peers and 
society. There is a relationship therefore between the dimension of thought and that of 
society. Society informs thought or self-consciousness and thought. In turn, self-
consciousness and thought bear on society. 
Intersubjectivity and language are necessary for both self-consciousness and 
institutions. We thus have to see the development of the psychological level 
and the sociological level as interconnecting.290  
Some writers291 go as far as regarding intersubjectivity and society as the same notion. Once 
we start dealing with society and breach the subjective or individual dimension292 we move 
into considering objectivity, which is a social criterion for plausibility, truth and reliability. 
Shared notions must pass the objectivity test. It is perhaps a credible proposal to state that 
objectivity is a result and goal of intersubjective processes. Emmeche et al. may be implying 
this same idea when they state that, 
But if form, structure, relation, Gestalt etc. are no longer considered as 
subjectivist features, but rather as objectively existing then form and matter 
may unite as equally objective.293 
 
3.11 Primordial Soup, Trial and Error Period 
 
The insights in this section are a further example of how Emmeche et al. draw from other 
theorists to explain emergence. The hint on the influence of evolution in their theory comes 
from Morgan’s statement they recall in explaining his “emergent evolution”294 that “at a 
certain point in the evolutionary process, the dialectical development will cause quantitative 
                                                
289 Emmeche et al, 1997  
290 Emmeche et al, 1997   
291 For example, Smith and Husserl, 2012 
292 These are mindsets, opinions and thoughts of the individual. 
293 Emmeche et al, 1997  
294 Emmeche et al, 1997  
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elements to synthesize into qualitatively different elements”295. The influence of Polanyi,  
Darwin and Morgan296 rings clear in their ontology. 
There are crucial lessons in the treatment of the notion around the “primordial” soup that 
deserves this distinct section. Emmeche et al. pick on the phenomenon of the primordial 
soup297 and liken it to an “anlage”298. “The life-constituting process in the "primordial soup" 
is a very time-consuming process299 (where)...one form wins300.” One quickly recognises the 
resonance of this phenomenon with Darwinism or evolution which Emmeche et al. confirm  
when they say, “the constitution of a primary entity presupposes a time consuming 
‘Darwinian301 trail-and-error’ period”302.  
The foregoing appears to contrast emergence from reductionism in that predictability is not 
possible at the initial stages but there is movement towards systematic functionality that 
could not have been guessed at the onset. The process, in this case, has factors that limit the 
ability to compute which life form will proceed from it. These range from complexity at the 
onset, boundary conditions and time. The life constituting process, being non-linear has the 
possibility of creating a range of outcomes. The relationship of the process and emergence 
then comes together and is effectively rounded up as follows by Emmeche et al: 
The primary emergence of a level of living systems on earth consists of (a) the 
emergence of an entity, a living cell with DNA, where the genetic information 
in the DNA constitutes the constraining conditions for life on Earth (the 
"boundary conditions" of Polanyi 1968), and (b) the subsequent of the 
(ecological, physiological, genetical, etc.) relations between various versions 
of the primary entity.303  
                                                
295 Emmeche et al, 1997  
296 Morgan, 1922 
297 A combination of many elements that is suggested to have been at the earliest stage of the formation of an 
organism 
298 An anlage is the primary cluster of embryonic cells that forms a body part in the gestation process. 
299 Emmeche et al, 1997  
300 Emmeche et al, 1997  
301 Of or Related to Charles Darwin’s theory and especially about his notions of evolution and natural selection. 
302 Emmeche et al, 1997   
303 Emmeche et al, 1997   
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There are, in this summation on Polanyi304, two necessary phenomena for emergence. There 
is the entity itself complete with the conditions that are determinant and these are 
alternatively called “boundary conditions”. The second phenomenon is the group of factors 
within which that unit or entity exists which have a bearing on its functions, processes, and 
state.  
 
 
3.12 Conclusion  
 
This chapter opened with a discussion on how Emmeche et al. separate emergence from 
mechanistic materialism and reductionism. Mechanical determinism claims supporting 
notions of direct causation fall short of explaining a lot of phenomena. This enables a view of 
emergence as an authentic scientific notion worthy of study, focus and application. 
Emmeche et al’s conceptualisation of emergence seems to enable a wide material and 
immaterial application. They remark that instances of emergence are countless. Emmeche et 
al’s theory emphasises levels, their relationship and the dynamics of these relationships. 
Levels are related in a form that Emmeche et al. describe as supervenience. This implies the 
lack of inferiority and reductionism in the distinction of levels that are higher or lower. 
Although each level distinctly exists, it is related to others bears on the other levels. In other 
words, there is a form of determinism. There is determinism but there is also potentiality. The 
entity has the capability to become something else because of processes and/or time. There is 
information available about the entity but there is incapacity in determining what it means on 
the progression of the process. 
Borders between levels, due to supervenience, are not distinct. Border distinction may be 
confined to mechanical notions and not complex ones. Complexity means that there is always 
a factor linking phenomena at distinct levels. Since there is a relationship between upper and 
lower level phenomena, it is possible to view entities as wholes, or gestalts. The phenomena 
present as patterns or wholes. 
Emergence is related to holism. An emergent entity has holistic behaviour. Societies 
represent the phenomenon of the gestalt. Subjective or individual consciousness interacts 
with notions that are objective and pertain to the social system that has plausibility, truth and 
reliability as criteria. A level is reliant on the level below it. The life constituting process, for 
instance, has conditions that curtail and sustain life. The process, long-drawn, is therefore one  
                                                
304 Goldstein, 2012 
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that determines extinction or survival of life forms.  
If emergence is to form a model for a process or processes, we should require a refined set of 
conditions extracted from Emmeche et al and Polanyi’s conceptualisation of emergence. 
Below are conditions that may be stated:  
1. Firstly, there should be found relatedness of the levels 
2. Dynamism must be a feature of the system. This should also entail significant 
consequences from small variations or tweaks  
3. Relatedness of levels and the difficulty in distinguishing seperations 
4. A pattern emanating from the special interaction must manifest but is should not be 
apparent when regarding the “components” 
5. Objectivity must be a feature of the system. The system works as itself and responds 
to its reality 
6. There must be a difficulty of top-up explanation against top-down is a hallmark of 
emergent phenomena. The possibility of linear explanation, an opposite of this 
feature, is typical in mechanical systems. This is either an inability to explain the 
top up effect using current knowledge but ability to explain top-down or the 
inability to do both (innovation may deal with the former).  
7. There are two forms of processes it has been applied to in the above 
conceptualisation by Emmeche et al. The first can be understood to be phenomena 
we cannot clarify using our current knowledge. We can pin their determinants but 
cannot reasonably spell out the interactions that finally give rise to a phenomenon 
which presents. The second form, lies outside our ability even to define the 
determinants. 
8. There is interaction during their creation. This may imply some determinism of one 
on the other. There is interdependence at creation.  
9. There is no single aspect acting to causing of another. There is independent agency 
by each aspect even though it has influence on the other aspects. 
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Chapter 4 
Summary of Themes 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
We explored innovation in Chapter 2 and concluded, amongst other findings, that innovation 
is aimed at improving delivery and adding value. Innovation was determined by numerous 
factors to qualify as being complex. Influence of social factors, whether in its processes or 
adoption was also highlighted. 
In Chapter 3, the conclusion after analysing Emmeche et al’s perspective on emergence, 
emphasised the phenomena of supervenience, relatedness and uncovered two processes that 
qualify for emergence.  
This chapter synthesises the insights of the second and third chapters into a couple of themes. 
To structure the discussion, and to allow for better deduction in the closing chapter, the 
discussion has been split into six groups of related or contesting themes. In each one, a 
condensation is made of the content from previous chapters. The objective in each case is to 
relate emergence and innovation.  It is certain that, another author could have chosen 
different themes and perhaps formulate them differently, but the idea here is to take together 
six angles that may help us with an overall answer as to the role of the concept of emergence 
in thinking about innovation. 
 
4.2 Systems and Innovation 
 
In the “open innovation” notion, the internal organisational system is rendered prone to the 
influence of external factors and the resultant interplay yields a product which, in theory, is 
much more refined than in closed systems. There is benefit in viewing the open innovation 
notion as a complex system whilst contrasting it with closed innovation. Closed innovation 
systems may be viewed as mechanical and bearing little complexity.  
In analysing the DIM, there are diverse types of adopters in the adopter unit and there is no 
certainty about innovation. The early adopter unit group has heterogeneous qualities. It is a 
group composed of distinct individuals with variant yet complementing behaviours, 
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characters and roles. Each a system305 and determinant to different degrees, they in turn form 
part of the early adopter system in this crucial stage of innovation. 
Weick also calls organisations tension systems to bring out the fact that participants in them 
are not always in agreement. They have opposing interests at certain times. This tension, 
whilst denoting conflict and systems within the bigger organisational system, is a 
sensemaking opportunity and this extends to a dialectical creation of organisational realities. 
Not only is there an effect by the environment on the organisation or group, the organisation 
and group are also affecting306 the environment. This stresses the assertion that innovation is 
a significantly dialectical307 concept.  
The phenomenon of knowledge assets requires consideration in system terms. The creation of 
knowledge systems is never from “first principles”. Individual backgrounds act and inform 
the process. These backgrounds or experiences are positive or negative. They have a bearing 
on the design of knowledge systems. This creates a management problem: in our intention to 
shore up what will be useful in future innovation process, are there any guidelines on what to 
preserve? Is it possible to design some criteria for this with guarantees for its endurance of 
changes in technology, for example? Is it possible to avoid “hoarding” of influences308?  
It is possible to draw parallels between this depiction and Chesbrough description of open 
innovation wherein internal systems, in an interaction with those that are external, produces 
novelty. It can be suggested then, that a marketable product, idea or innovation is a system of 
systems and a whole. 
There is another way of viewing systems in developing an understanding of emergence with 
innovation. Weick calls organisation tension systems.  He implies, in this characterisation, the 
fact that there is often little agreement in this entity that still is expected to act as a unit and 
yet, also, for our purposes, create and innovate. The regard, also by Weick, of organisations 
as “sensible’ environment is also metaphorical. 
There are further characterisations, still metaphorical, we traced through our analysis. From 
the comparison of organisations to organisms in the metaphor of Morgan’s. The organism is a 
systems notion. 
                                                
305Innovations are the outcome of several other creative processes and these are systems in themselves. 
306 Effects must be understood as being both positive and negative 
307 In the sense one phenomenon affecting the other in reciprocation 
308 That is, allowing too much influence of those aspects that will have a qualitative impact on innovation. 
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Boisot’s Social Learning Cycle is also complex systems view as is the metaphors of viewing 
an organisation of Morgan’s. 
Throughout the above descriptions, there are notions of complex systems depicted. There is 
also entrenched creativity, scaling and levels since the interaction of inputs, conversations, 
conflicts and environmental factors yield novelty. In these phenomena, we discover 
emergence at work. 
 
4.3 Predictability Vs. Control 
 
Uncertainty can be perceived as being double barrelled. Its first connotation may be seen to 
apply to the indecision by an adopter in the DIM due to lack of comprehensive 
information309. This paralyses decision making and is dealt with in a section alongside 
information and complexity. 
Its second notion may apply to a characteristic of complex systems and is related to our 
inability to say what a system’s status will be like in future. It is related to information but in 
the sense that there is too much of it and there is no easy computation on how information 
sets will interplay in determining the system.  
Our desire to know more about a system is a predictability310 problem. Predictability is 
associated with control311. When we can “predict” a phenomenon, there is the comfort in our 
ability to plan for or about it. It appears the factor of information has some consequences in 
the innovation process or its diffusion or adoption. 
There appears to be a concurrence by Snowden with Weick in this sensemaking notion with 
regards to patterns and logic in the system with respect to time. The current state is a pattern 
and one of the numerous possible outcomes at the initial stages. Like Boisot, Snowden 
locates organisational phenomenon transitioning312, through time, in a dimension of 
unpredictability. It appears to widen the field of theorists who point out to the 
unpredictability of organisational systems.  
                                                
309 This is the same uncertainty referred to when dealing with markets for instance. 
310 Predictability is a quality that rates how much awareness an observer has about the behaviour of elements or 
the likely consequence in the interaction of elements in a system or process. Understanding the explanation to 
refer to awareness of a result encroaches the province of mechanical phenomena and this is outside the scope of 
this theme. 
311 To be understood as the ability to intervene on the course of a process for changing or determining a result 
or results. 
312 Our reference to “organizational transitioning” goes beyond the various forms of business innovation 
described in Chapter 2 and extends to other forms as would be found in social innovation processes. 
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Our understanding of unpredictability must not be to be uncomfortable about an outcome but 
a satisfaction that even a phase in the process that seems out of place, which creates the 
unpredictability, is still a feature giving form and a pattern. A view of innovation within the 
framework of emergence would denote an acceptance of innovation as bearing an 
unpredictable quality at certain stages. This should adjust the view of innovation as being a 
planned and controlled process for the most part. 
 
4.4 Information Input, Monitoring and Time 
 
Related to control and predictability is a desire for significant amount of information about a 
system. This desire, ironically, almost always entails growing complexity in our 
understanding of the system. Our intention in seeking data and information, when we monitor 
the possible number of indicators, is to increase our understanding about the system but 
suffers a from the pitfall that as information increases, so does complexity. 
Management must, as this appears obligatory, provide details about innovation because in the 
scheme of organisational systems, there must be sufficient detail to enable accountability of 
action and cost to facilitate audit and learning processes amongst other reasons. At the 
conceptualisation or realisation for the need to innovate, there is excessive information or 
detail to work with. This gives rise to uncertainty about the innovation process. 
Uncertainty itself is a desirable phenomenon from a risk management point of view. When it 
exists, it enables scenario planning313 and assists in strategy formulation. It therefore is 
necessary, in this sense, to embrace it. That initial uncertainty is not a concern as has been 
discussed. It is a means to an appropriate result.  
The preoccupation must be on meeting the requirements of adopters by regarding the 
information input. Having something new is about generating value by having an adoptable 
result. It is one that the target group or population can adopt. Of course, a significant 
consideration must be given to late adopters. This is to say that there must be measures to 
ensure quick adoption by those who wait for more information to affirm the innovation 
process. The idea must be quickly assimilated by most the population or adopters. 
                                                
313 A strategy tactic that entails the consideration of different circumstances or events and deciding on the 
response appropriate for each one. In scenario planning, the strategist is interested in preparedness and having 
multiple options because of uncertainty or unpredictability. 
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Information also appears to be a common denominator between innovation and knowledge 
management. It can be suggested that innovation is one of the key ideas regarding knowledge 
management. It is 
1. A source – innovation provides information for knowledge management 
processes 
2. A beneficiary – in the sense that information is an input in innovation processes  
3. A determinant – innovation processes determine the nature of knowledge 
management  
4. An enabler – innovation provides for knowledge management 
Uncertainty, a key marker of emergence, is an inevitable aspect of innovation.  
 
4.5 Pluralism: An Innovation Problem? 
 
An organisation’s customer base is usually an array of individuals with different perceptions, 
paradigms and processes. Viewed in another way, they are systems that interact with an 
organisation’s in the innovation process. External systems, at the customers’ whim, are 
inputs, in their multitude, to the organisation’s creative processes. 
This same notion is reiterated in Chesbrough when he presents his description of the open 
innovation concept. Working with this concept, a firm will expose itself up to the inputs of its 
stakeholders and markets and allow that relationship and interaction to modify its technology, 
processes and so on. Here, there is heterogeneity in that multiple sources of input exist.  
Another way to perceive most forms heterogeneity is to regard the phenomenon in 
information terms. To be certain, a unit that has heterogeneity is characterised by the 
exchange of significant information. This phenomenon of information was dealt with earlier 
in a section 4.4.  
There is little chance of various participants in the unit or adopters, even early adopters, to be 
unitary. With some consideration on circumstances, this may be used to an advantage but the 
management skill that is demanded for that to happen is rare. This notion is implied by 
Snowden314 and Holland315. The concern is whether such skill can be imparted. The 
suspicion is that it is intuitive, tacit and acquired over a painstaking amount of time. 
                                                
314 Snowden, 2002 
315 Holland, 1998 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
 
An example of how heterogeneity can be used to advantage is with the irony of Emmeche et 
al’s project when we note the relationship between their project and the subject they tackle, 
emergence. They have drawn from several authorships like Morgan, Darwin and others and 
theories to produce a “collective” or comprehensive, multi-faceted description of emergence. 
Each collective network is a separate unit that participates in the formation of something new. 
In Weick’s sensemaking, what takes form and shape is the organisational system. But it is 
also derived from and determined by other systems at another level. There is collective action 
directed towards creativity. But the realisation must be a multitude of factors or systems at 
play which we describe elsewhere as a control challenge and before this as one requiring rare 
management skill. 
History can be viewed as part of this phenomenon of pluralism. It is critical to observe the 
characterisation of history, an input into the design process, as “baggage”316. This connotes 
bulky content that has useful/valuable qualities and some, not so. The problem, at the initial 
stages, is an unawareness of which aspect is worthwhile and which one is not.  
The “Start-Up Life Cycle”317 presents an opportunity to analyse the DIM graphically. It 
certainly would not be the way how innovations are funded, grow flourish or die most of the 
time. It comes close to trace the role of money in innovations. In true respect to complexity 
phenomena, the behaviour of the trend line depicted in the model would be different for each 
case. In fact, it is almost always difficult to determine the trend with accuracy because of the 
influence of multiple enablers bearing on the innovation. This is another dimension of 
variety. 
Emmeche et al’s treatment of creativity acknowledges a pluralism in their “make out of 
nothing” and inclusivity notion of the phenomenon. In acknowledging a self-regulation in the 
creativity notion, they imply a system’s activity capable in itself. This creativity likened to a 
child in growth. Pluralism is therefore a creative feature. Pluralism is a catalyst especially in 
the open innovation paradigm. This is not to rule it out in the closed innovation paradigm. 
The existence of pluralism in the open innovation scheme is a condition that introduces 
emergence. 
 
 
 
                                                
316 Snowden, 2002 
317 (ECE/CECI/7) United Nations, 2009  
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4.6 Value as a Target 
 
In this section, we will discuss some notions side by side because of their relationship. They 
are central themes in both innovation and emergence. We have brought forward Emmeche et 
al’s conceptualisation as a “Darwinism-like trial and error process”318 and assumed it to 
mean some evolution.  
Emmeche teases us about objectivity. Our discussion, within Emmeche et al, revealed that 
objectivity has aspects of validation. An innovative idea must be a plausible emergent from a 
thorough process. 
We should consider perceiving the “trial and testing”319 period as the formulation of 
objectivity. This period is the “thorough process”. The term “thorough” bears an irony. At 
first consideration, it brings notions of a careful plan for execution. The thoroughness in the 
scheme of creativity implies, surprisingly, some chaos and a “plan” may turn into an 
obstacle! 
Objectivity is an important theme in evolution, and creativity. It is therefore crucial to regard 
it as a boundary condition in Polanyi’s sense. It certainly is a factor for later adopters and 
investors as they seek to determine value of a new idea, concept or innovation and may 
“shallow” the “valley of death”320. 
Innovation viewed within the “Start-Up Life Cycle”321 especially considering the “valley of 
death” suggests the subjectivity of in its process. The innovation process and 
consumers/adopters are at the “mercy” of those who can fund innovation. This plays out 
more like how media manipulates the public with information. A critical question when 
discussing “value” in innovation should be: Whose value is it? 
We discovered also Rogers et al, in discussing the DIM, an inflection point as adoption starts 
to rise towards its peak. There are similarities between it and the inflection point322 before the 
tipping point on his model’s graph323. 
                                                
318 Emmeche et al, 1997 
319 Emmeche et al, 1997 
320 (ECE/CECI/7) United Nations, 2009 
321 (ECE/CECI/7) United Nations, 2009 
322 Rogers et al, 2004 
323 See Figure 6 
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The initial stages of any innovation have profound heterogeneity and resemble a “primordial 
soup”324. The various aspects, each of them being separate systems, determine the process as 
enablers. Because these aspects are systems, they are functional and have objectivity in their 
own regard. This objectivity extends to the way these systems interact. Objectivity is the most 
prominent attribute of properties at the lower level in emergence. In the innovation process, a 
goal or target or objective exists. The final state or structure is always a mystery from the 
start. What seems critical is the identification of a target as we learnt from Holland. 
Thereafter a filtration-like process takes place on the way to the “final” state. “Final” because 
the process of finding value is never complete. 
Filtration occurs through a process of people deciding on value. Value decisions, which we 
saw under DIM, may be analysed as processes of filtration. They determine success, the rate 
or failure of innovation processes. Throughout, there are no rules set but voluntary actions 
involved. The “voluntary” theme is strong in the DIM and in. Individuals, as the components 
of society, determine the success of innovation, whether it is the process or outcome by their 
objectives. In other words, they allow what they value to succeed. At one end of this filter-
like spectrum, are early adopters who have enough resources to experiment. On the other are 
late adopters who, not as “promiscuous”, finally tip the scale.  
An irony is implicit in the foregoing. Both early and late adopters perceive value differently.  
Since early adopters have adequate disposable resources, they can easily explore risk and new 
commodities without a great fear of loss. But their value is from an investment point of view. 
Late adopters on the other hand, opt for “tried and tested”325 innovations that are sustainable 
in consideration of their low-affording, risk adversity disposition. They perceive innovation 
with a consumer’s perspective. 
The discussion on objectivity must be balanced with the role of subjectivity in the innovation 
process. It seems inaccurate to focus on intersubjectivity without pointing out those 
subjective processes, though hardly valid and struggling with plausibility, are mostly initial 
stages of intersubjective ones. This is made clear in Weick’s social creation notion. 
Subjectivity has its place in creativity. When we seek to create new artefacts, we must 
interpret the world and create models that must be tested intersubjectively.  
                                                
324 Emmeche et al, 1997 
325 Emmeche et al, 2007 
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Value in innovation is a shifting phenomenon. It therefore ascribes innovation some level of 
emergence or renders innovation to be perceived as emergent as it moves from one composite 
form to the next, and one gestalt to another. 
 
4.7 Creative Transcendence 326 and the Nexus  
 
The phrase “creative transcendence” may not have appeared before this section. It however 
excellently describes a prevailing notion in several theories discussed in the previous 
chapters. The concept here is to extend the inference of the foregoing discussion. We will 
start with Emmeche et al’s observation of virtual borders relating different fields separating 
them but causing their interaction. We introduced this phenomenon as supervenience.  
Whilst dealing with Rogers et al’ DIM we illustrated the diffusion of innovation using the 
graph in Fig. 6. The point before the inflection point is clearly lower than at the peak of 
adoption.  Although there is a difference in the levels, the inflection itself is not really an 
acute turn. It is a curve, and this implies some gradualness in the “transformation” or 
adoption.  
The phenomenon of heterogeneity in DIM has some characteristics of, and functions to 
illustrate, supervenience. It is that indescribable yet beautiful accommodation of variety, 
multiplicity and “multi-culturedness” it possesses that interests us. The interaction of 
differences facilitates creative transcendence from a scale or level to another with some 
smoothness more interesting than in homophilic environments.  
If this point of inflection facilitates a shift, then we can describe it as being at the border. It is 
a nexus327. This zone should be celebrated as a region for insight that Holland cites. What is 
insight? It is the ability to see deep and beyond one’s paradigm. In other words, a 
transcendence past the limitations of one’s zone to grasp the mechanisms of the next, higher, 
new zone or work out how that next zone should be formulated.  
Not only is there transition (or movement) in this phenomenon we are dealing with, there is 
some of translation. Early adopters are at this intersection and must almost equal those 
participating in the innovation process on their insight. Both groups must oscillate between 
old and new forms of a concept as they test and “taste” the new and contrast it with the old.  
                                                
326 Rabb, 2014. This phrase is used here with a slightly different connotation. It appeared to best describe the 
notion in two words! 
327 A zone that joins two sets; an intersection; the area that bears the characteristics of sides that are adjacent. 
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Weick’s remarks about sensemaking, at a point, and in a sense, appear to relate it to 
supervenience. This is because the process of sensemaking works towards the creation of a 
composite picture. It starts at the subjective level whilst gravitating towards the 
intersubjective. It wants to fulfil the requirements of the “generic subjective”328 level. This is 
composite and a gestalt.  
In another dimension, it can still be argued, therefore, that since innovation is an open 
system, the spread or diffusion is part of the innovation process. An innovation is transformed 
and developed continuously. We can support this using the DIM. What is of concern is 
having a measure of readiness to adopt or innovate. It is a function of competence, resources, 
culture and other factors we discussed under Dey's enablers. 
Supervenience is one reason why we can never “feel” evolution and let alone predict it. It can 
only be historically perceived when we work to analyse what is emergent at the global scale 
and attempt an explanation of prior processes. We cannot, however be accurate about what 
caused it. This is because, as we prefer to view the processes as complex phenomena in their 
typical tradition, we can never attribute the outcome to direct causation. Innovation is a 
process dependant on the exploitation of relationships between multiple concepts at distinct 
levels.  
 
4.8 Summary 
 
Several theories had been discussed before the opening of this chapter. It was necessary to 
condense the debate into workable themes. The exercise also established emergence concepts 
within innovation. 
Chiefly, innovation is characterised by systems that are complex. These manifest because of 
several factors that include those that are external and internal in the open innovation 
concept. The systems also extend to individual influences identified in the DIM for instance.  
The theme of systems within innovation must be considered, regarding innovation, in terms 
of how well they can be managed. Innovation exhibits unpredictability and uncertainty 
characteristics. This makes it eligible for perception as an emergent phenomenon. Prediction 
and uncertainty are inversely related to control.  
Information presents a heterogeneity factor and increases complexity. It sophisticates 
management activity. On the surface, however, it is necessary to accumulate it to find a basis 
                                                
328 Weick, 1995 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
 
for decision making. This is the irony it presents. In this light, information must be a 
significant consideration when discussing prediction and control. 
There should be an objective of extracting value from an innovation process. But value is a 
composite. It is the result of a thorough process targeting at realising a new reality. In this 
manner, the notion has connotations of levels and a requirement to impose some the 
realisation of benefits at a stage that balances investor concerns and thoroughness in the 
process. 
The discussion of levels is incomplete without the regard of the interaction between them. 
That edge was identified as a zone of translation.  
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Chapter 5 
Innovation and Emergence  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 1 stated an objective of this exercise as being to expose the role of complexity and, 
especially, emergence theories in organisational innovation processes using select literature 
analysis. 
Innovation and emergence were explained in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. Chapter 4 
summarised the six major themes of the chapters on innovation and emergence as the first 
step towards a synthesis. 
In this chapter we consider three possible positions regarding the relationship between 
emergence and innovation as an interpretation of the six themes in Chapter 4. On certain 
issues, it will be necessary to make references to the theories in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. The 
discussion will commence with three potential views regarding the emergence and 
innovation. 
 
5.2 Three Potential Views 
 
This section is an introduction to three forms of possible views or stances as a closing 
discussion of complexity, with a special focus on emergence and, innovation. Sections 5.3 to 
5.5 will provide an assessment of each of these views. The sections will draw from the study 
to establish merits and demerits of each view. 
The first possible view is of emergence as an explanation of the innovation process. We can 
paraphrase this or extend it in at least two ways. These are that (1) innovation is an emergent 
process and, (2) that we should be able to trace emergent properties within the process of 
innovation. 
A second view, use the first one, above, as an assumption and considers emergence as a 
prescription for innovation. The suggestion is what one may call “application”, that is to say 
emergence is a template for innovation processes. This view likens emergence as a tool to 
use, prior to an innovation process, for setting out actions and plans that are aimed at 
achieving innovation. It translates it into a model or teaching tool for innovations and 
innovation phenomena. 
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Thirdly, there is the possibility of seeing emergence as a metaphor for innovation. A 
metaphor appeals to symbolism. It is necessary to differentiate this view from the other two 
views. In the first, the import is that innovation is an emergent process whereas in this third 
view, the desire is to use emergence as an analogue without claiming that it is necessarily the 
template for innovation processes. So, the third view is a cautious perspective and might also 
only apply to a part of the innovation process. 
The discussion that follows considers each of the three views in turn in the sequence they 
were presented here. 
 
5.3 Innovation as an Emergent Process 
 
In the systems consideration in Chapter 4 and especially in the open innovation concept, the 
internal organisational system is rendered prone to the influence of external factors and the 
resultant interplay yields a product which, in theory, is much more refined than in closed 
systems. 
Working in the open innovation paradigm, a firm will expose itself up to the inputs of its 
stakeholders and markets and allow that relationship and interaction to modify its technology, 
processes and so on. Here, there is heterogeneity in that multiple sources of input exist 
contributing to the innovation process.  
Rather than paying attention to metrics of factors that we can identify or input, complexity in 
innovation demands that we monitor closely the interaction and consequences of what see 
emerging. Hoarding is likely to occur at the creativity stages when a system is open, and this 
gives rise to complexity. 
The early adopter unit group has heterogeneous qualities. It is a group composed of distinct 
individuals with variant yet complementing behaviours, characters and roles. Each a 
system329 and determinant to different degrees, they in turn form part of the early adopter 
system in this crucial stage of innovation. Because these are different systems, they are what 
Weick calls tension systems and are dialectical in that they interact in their diversity. 
There seems to be some noise and at a certain stage of adoption before mass adoption. This is 
one way of looking at the problem. The second is to consider this as an evolutionary concept, 
regarded as parallel to emergence, where the fittest concept will survive and win. This 
conceptualisation of innovation satisfies the Gestalt view wherein the bigger picture matters. 
                                                
329 Innovations are the outcome of several other creative processes and these are systems in themselves. 
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In discussing emergence and its appropriateness as an explanation for innovation and 
alongside our understanding of these two notions within the complexity theory paradigm, the 
refreshing discovery is the role of human cognition in the full scheme. It is at play as an 
influence within enablers, in the development of disciplines and levels, perceiving nexuses 
(subjective) and testing combinations (intersubjective), choosing building blocks inside the 
noise and chaos and in the process also discovering and realising upper level properties.  
Emergence is a promising idea to model dynamic and transformational organisational 
processes concepts. It however fails to account for the control that is necessary after 
convergence330 when the innovation reaches maturity and must be primed for commerce or 
utilisation. Utilisation is perhaps what Boisot331 describes as “codification”.  
Further, when we combine to the realisation of some significant phenomenon, whose is it? 
There are intellectual property implications that must be considered. The significant point is 
that, at a point in the function of organisations, innovative ideas must be “owned” through 
stabilisation by management. This means that accountability must be conferred, responsibility 
given, and control exercised. Whilst the distinction of this stage may be a vague 
phenomenon, a good consideration may be the role of money in creativity and innovation. 
We discussed this in the Start-Up Life Cycle. The other consideration, based on the ability to 
determine whether assimilation has gone beyond early adopters, is the DIM where it may be 
necessary to assess how quickly innovative ideas are assimilated by late adopters. Late 
adopters have a poor appetite for complexity. 
We cannot deal with the entire process of innovation as an emergent phenomenon since a 
stage arrives when forms of mechanistic and reductionist activities are necessary to organise 
the result. The reasons for this include the necessity to take account of financial resources 
expended in the innovation, the need to give accountability and the fulfilment of obligation to 
shareholders, protection of the innovation or copyrighting and so on.  
The problem the view is that the full scale of the innovation process is not wholly emergent. 
Some components, activities, tasks are reductionist. There is indeed significant uncertainty at 
the creative stages. The process must have structure as it concludes or to realise some benefit. 
 
 
                                                
330 Used here to mean the consolidation and sifting of the many ideas coming from heterogeneity, pluralism and 
open systems into a unit that can be considered as the outcome to proceed with. This is a representation of the 
creative processes. 
331 Boisot, 1998 
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5.4 Emergence as a Prescription for Innovation 
 
The proposition of viewing emergence as a template or design on how to design or support an 
innovative process should be considered. This is at least on the basis that organisations, 
obsessed with formulas, strategies and didactic instruction may desire a concrete and 
empirical way of structuring innovation processes. So, a prescriptive view may be appealing 
to certain organisation players. 
A prescription is only possible when all the factors are known. A prescription is structured, 
based on known conditions and on controlled conditions. In a prescription, the course of 
action or activities is decided on beforehand. The steps are assumed as the best and the plan is 
assumed as best for the circumstances, present and predicted. Prescription introduced early or 
from the onset brings a predictability and stability at a phase where it is not desired in the 
innovation process. 
The view that emergence can be used as a prescription in innovation is faulty in two respects. 
Firstly, it draws emergence into the realm of mechanical and reductionist notions. As if the 
concept can be usefully applied as a template. Secondly, from the standpoint of creativity, 
limits are introduced by the very nature of the prescription. The risks where a structured plan 
is introduced, openness is lost, creativity is minimised, and reductionism gained. We must 
still acknowledge that reductionism seems desirable to stabilise innovation and this is a 
notion explained and suggested in the other sections of this chapter. In the section below, 
there is an identification of the phase where it may be necessary to set structures and 
introduce stability in the innovation process. 
Whilst open innovation is a prescriptive notion, as in: a strategy for innovation that is likely 
to work better than closed innovation and therefore recommended and allowed for, this does 
not mean emergence is. Stating that open innovation is recommended and citing it for 
fostering better creativity is different from “prescribing” emergence. Open innovation is an 
acknowledgement and celebration of the nature of complexity in organisational systems and 
therefore benefits from emergence.  
The proposition that emergence can be a template for innovation casts a contradiction on the 
concept itself. It places it in the realms of reductionism and outside complexity. 
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5.5 Emergence as a Metaphor 
 
A metaphor is symbolic of a target of study or perception. Morgan’s332 metaphors are useful 
for segments, parts of processes, from a viewpoint and whilst not representing the total 
organisational system, may focus on systems or their parts. 
At the point when the need to innovate becomes clear, there is excessive information or detail 
to work with. In fact, innovation is easier in an environment that is information-heavy. 
Information is still just one of the phenomena presenting for consideration at this stage. We 
discussed these phenomena as present the characteristic of heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is 
also endeared by the influence of external input as in the open innovation concept. 
Heterogeneity also manifests as conflict and in fact make up what Holland regards as 
“building blocks”. In this case, innovation becomes an emergent phenomenon of dialectical 
processes between aspects inside the organisation and those outside it.  
Heterogeneity is catalytic and synonymous with emergence. Innovation may then be viewed 
as being a culmination of eclectic processes or systems. Heterogeneity, pluralism and 
eclecticism333, in a considerable of cases, increases innovation ideas’ appeal. The common 
perception of heterogeneity, is that it brings uncertainty in the innovation process. 
Uncertainty, within complexity, and beyond its being a hallmark, is not a concern as has been 
discussed. But multiplicity scares investors and late adopters. They are searching for 
certainty. But certainty is a form of value that is ensured by a thorough process. We can 
therefore state the irony that thoroughness is difficult to achieve or guarantee without 
heterogeneity. It is a means to an appropriate result.  Uncertainty is beneficial, because it is 
really a sign of various kinds and levels of input bringing form.  
In this dimension, rather than paying attention to metrics of factors that we can identify or 
input, complexity in innovation demands that we monitor closely the interaction and 
consequences of what see emerging as Snowden proposes. These complex interactions are 
where creativity in most likely. Creativity seems to proliferate in complexity. Emergent 
phenomena yield us value through creativity inherent in complex processes. That form, the 
certainty and value, should yield, at a certain point or at certain points, to a stability that can 
be sold. This is what organisational objectives, national plans, business is about. This speaks 
of another level in innovation. 
                                                
332 A metaphor 
333 Used to mean: inspired by or drawing from various sources or theories. 
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The stable phase is what “management” is known to focus on. Management is known to be 
about extracting hard data, compiling statistics, making decisions, following plans and 
budgets. In other words, management is about control. Management must, as this appears 
obligatory, provide details about innovation because in the scheme of organisational systems, 
there must be sufficient detail to enable accountability of action and cost to facilitate audit 
and learning processes amongst other reasons.  
Early adopters, closely bearing the characteristics of the innovators may not mind the 
instability and complexity on the development and introduction of a new product. But late 
adopters are attracted by stability and are unfortunately the majority of the adopter 
population! At a point, therefore, some stability must be guaranteed. 
The view that creativity yields to control, iteratively and that emergence is pronounced within 
creativity is a fitting of this third perspective. At face value, this view of emergence as a 
model and metaphor for creativity appears to posit it as a feeble notion. This is from the 
obsession to formulas and mechanical notions. Complexity proponents may be comfortable 
with it since it posits emergence as a critical to creativity, which, in earnest, is the bedrock of 
innovation. It also allows the presentation of innovation as both open and closed, that is 
sensitive to stakeholders and environmental factors but also subject to management control.  
Another metaphor is that innovation presents us with another way of explaining the 
interaction of mechanical reductionism, characterised by the stability we explained above, 
and complexity, a notion best explaining the instability within creativity.  At certain points in 
the innovation process, especially at creative instances, emergence is exhibited and is a 
necessity. 
This foregoing analysis was anticipated when we explained the problem of the first view that 
proposes innovation as being wholly emergent. This proposition seems to be the most viable 
view amongst those presented. 
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This study enables the view that innovation is a notion that demonstrates that complex and 
mechanical or reductionist aspects can contribute to the realisation of organisational results. It 
advances the view that there can be a connection or collaboration between complexity and 
reductionism. 
The complex aspects of innovation that were uncovered in the study reduce the obsession to 
place all innovation activities in the zone of control. Obviously, the extent of control and 
openness will vary from establishment to establishment and depend on the type of service or 
product that is the subject of innovation. 
Creativity is therefore not for technical individuals or subject matter experts to act as the only 
participants in the innovation process. At points when uncertainty characterises process, this 
should be embraced as part of the process, cost and management control considered. 
Notions of complexity and emergence may be among many useful in explaining creativity 
within innovation. So, on a macro-scale, a study such as this one is likely to shift perceptions 
on emergence and complexity from being mere theories and notions to them being utilitarian. 
An implicit suggestion in this study has been to support, where this exists, the predominant 
definition of innovation. It is as “soft” as it “hard”. Weick’s “enactment”, amongst other 
views, enables this assessment. 
The reliance on one text for emergence in this study could have caused a narrow view of the 
notion. More insights could have been possible had more texts been analysed. The strategy of 
using more texts on emergence, on the other hand, could have had the result of complicating 
the study and creating a wider range of study material. The shortcoming of analysing a single 
text on emergence can, perhaps, be balanced by another study using a different text on 
emergence but addressing the same inquiry as this study attempted. 
The wide spectrum on theories for both innovation and complexities created difficulties in the 
analysis. It was perceived that a reliance on only one or two theorists could have provided for 
an inadequate and poorly balanced analysis. It would have also only enabled a shallower 
conclusion.  
Perceptions on the effect of using the number of theorists done in this study may be regarded 
by readers differently.  
The strategy of doing a textual analysis and then distilling, for convenience, the lessons into 
the classification of themes in Chapter 4 is certain to have created some omissions. The 
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results from this strategy is certain to have created some bias. Whether a different strategy 
would have improved the validity of the “results”, in another attempt, is worth considering.  
It is apparent that this qualitative study was a challenge to design for. The inquiry was still 
worthwhile to attempt! 
To start with, creativity within innovation, as demonstrated in the previous chapters through 
the analysis of theories, points to an unpredictability of organisational systems. We must 
clarify that this unpredictability is not found throughout the array of organisational systems. 
There is a challenge in viewing the full innovation process as being emergent. The problem 
with this is that value is normally extracted within the circumstances of some control or 
mechanical processing. Some mechanical, reductionist activities, quite variant to emergent 
processes are necessary at certain stages. Said differently, innovation initially consists of 
divergence because of creativity (or the emergence of new patterns), but later must become 
more focused and convergent to ossify into products or services334. 
Subsequently, our discussion focused on the implausibility of proposing emergence as a 
prescription for innovation. This idea that innovation may be a template for innovation 
appears to be the least defensible. It has many faults and is the weakest of the three proposals 
discussed. This conceptualisation would be based on a misplaced notion that emergence is 
mechanical. Presented in another way, this gives rise to a problem diametrically to the first 
proposition, stated in the preceding paragraph. The greatest set-back in regarding emergence 
as a prescription for innovation is perhaps the fact that it is a concept that is useful in 
explanation. It is not a framework for planning the course of creativity.  
The first view seems to hold some promise, whilst the second view does not resonate with the 
worldview of emergence, and the third metaphorical view seems to be the appropriate way to 
see the initial divergent phase of the innovative process. There is management of complexity 
before convergence and in the unstable and create phases of innovation and of reductionist 
and mechanical management close to a convergence, used in this section to describe the 
phenomenon where heterogeneity settles or unifies into a marketable concept. This may be 
argued as a process of self-regulation. It denotes another level, a composite or a gestalt. 
Emergence in innovation is significant in at least two conditions. Firstly, it is significant 
before convergence, that is, in the unstable phase of the innovation process. Emergence is 
also significant within multiplicity or heterogeneity. We have not deeply dealt with 
heterogeneity in a dimension that considers the competence that interdisciplinary individuals 
                                                
334 Or in the language of emergence, a new stable level. 
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bring into the creative process. The closest notion to that discussion were Holland’s view of 
“insight” and the interpretation Weick’s explanation of the “subjective”. If anything, this puts 
stress on two themes that received wide coverage. The first is that of heterogeneity. The other 
is that of “creative transcendence”. Both “insight” and the “subjective” are unstable zones 
and represent emergent phenomena on their level. 
A potential positive consequence of individual interdisciplinary combinations in creative 
work is the increase in appeal or flavour of the product. There is appeal, because each 
participant in the creative process draws and applies their experience to the artefact, and 
flavour, because each participant’s “taste” is part of the product.  
Wheatley and Friese have an exciting perspective on the foregoing:  
Rather than worry about critical mass, our work is to foster critical 
connections...Through these relationships, we will develop the new knowledge, 
practices, courage, and commitment that lead to broad-based change... When 
separate, local efforts connect with each other as networks, and then 
strengthen as communities of practice, suddenly and surprisingly a new 
system emerges at a greater level of scale... Emergence is how life creates 
radical change and takes things to scale.335 
The type of control we find in dealing with complex phenomena is quite distinct from that in 
settings where mechanical processing is pronounced. We therefore retain a level of 
management ability and this means keeping very close watch on the emergent phenomena. It 
is management of a distinct kind. Management befitting emergent phenomena. Management 
that varies from mostly monitoring (of complex phenomena) and control when we know what 
gives value. Both monitoring and control can feature simultaneously, even focused on aspects 
of the same phenomena. This is due to multiplicity in most innovation processes.  
It can be stated that: 
1. We are unable to predict innovation, 
2. Because innovation is eclectic, it can be said to be complex. Innovation is 
endeared by variety. Variety is what gives innovation its novelty and appeal, 
and 
3. Enablers, on the other hand provide innovation the quality that causes us to say 
it is an emergent phenomenon at the creativity stages 
                                                
335 Wheatley and Frieze, 2006 
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So, the consolation is that, at certain points, if we are really concerned with control, there is 
an opportunity to manage. And still, even unstable phenomena are “managed” by insight, for 
example, in the manner Holland explains. It is also managed by recognising its complexity as 
Snowden proposes.  
The overall assessment, then, is to assert that innovation has stages entail emergent 
phenomena and emergence is a metaphor of some creativity within innovation. Emergence is 
a characteristic of the unstable zones. Value and stability are the results of this emergence, 
amongst other factors. Emergence is a technical concept in complexity. It is a notion that 
explains the connection between various stable labels. This lays an emphasis on the edge, 
supervenience and the nexus. These should be considered as zones of high creativity and 
insight.  
In proposing emergence as a metaphor of the instability in innovation, the real celebration 
emanates from the role of “creative transcendence”. This is the concept positing the nexus as 
a zone of interpretation even though it has, and because of, uncertainty. The picture that is 
painted is stability and instability existing in a variety of systems in the unit. There is 
interaction of these systems on their edges. These interactions disregard time and space, can 
exist in the same or different section, department or sector and so on. The interaction can also 
happen at the same or separate instances. What matters is that they may be unstable or 
stabilised to benefit both creativity, as emergent phenomena, and provide value, as stable 
phenomena, respectively. Innovation can therefore be described as bipolar. 
It is consequently not enough to find multiplicity. It is more viable to find where it coincides 
and converges into a stable, within-reach marketable entity. The unstable notions, the 
emphasis in this thesis, must be justly viewed as the conditions for creativity. Each system 
oscillates in and out of stability. An election process, from a contending party’s primary 
election stage to inauguration is an illustration suitable for this description. In the build-up to 
a vote, there is turbulence, chaos and uncertainty. The process is nearly always stabilised in 
the period after the casting of votes. Rules and conduct of managing processes are clear and 
obscure in various phases of this system. Even in “stable” phases, there are normally signs 
that the turbulence, chaos and uncertainty will return. But each process, each cycle, is 
difference from the one before or after it. It ushers a new reality or a fresh level.  
Emergence may be one of the best notions of explaining the creative phase within innovation 
within organisations. 
Although it suffers a handicap that it does not accommodate the full innovation cycle, the 
advantage of positing emergence as a metaphor for innovation provides an opportunity to 
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teach innovation in a new way. That approach to view innovation as a process that features 
stability and instability. This binary view should not restrict itself to a linear process in 
innovation where the instability, comprised of creative activity that is an emergent 
phenomenon and the stability, marked by predictive and control-related activity occur in 
sequence. This may be the case. The preferred view should be to present an oscillation of 
both stability and instability within the innovation process. Since organisations are systems 
not composed of single event, it may well be that several innovative processes can take place 
simultaneously and be at various levels of stability.  
The need to use different texts on emergence in a study with the same strategy as this one was 
addressed at the beginning of this section. Even though there has been a lot of research on 
complexity and emergence, there still seems to be some gaps in how it must be understood, 
defined and applied. Perhaps, a future study along the lines of the one done here will lead to 
different and even more interesting conclusions, 
Respectively, Weick and Snowden’s sensemaking and Cynefin Models present content that 
can be studied in light of innovation. They seem to offer an excellent opinion in analysis of 
the role of complexity in innovation. The two theories also have an appeal in organisational 
settings of different descriptions: political, commercial, community, academic and so on.  
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